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ABSTRACT 
 
This study investigated the viability of an instrument 
called the Biophilic Attitudes Inventory (BAI), a pen-and-
paper instrument intended to measure attitudes toward nature 
that, according to naturalist Edward O. Wilson, are rooted 
in an innate predisposition that humans possess to connect 
with other forms of life. Utilizing confirmatory factor 
analysis (CFA), two models were tested (n=334)--a seven-
factor model that reflected Stephen Kellert’s biophilia 
typology and a more parsimonious two-factor model. However, 
neither model proved viable in terms of construct validity. 
As a result, a new model with four factors was developed via 
exploratory factor analysis (EFA). A subsequent CFA revealed 
a reasonable fit between the data and the four-factor model. 
An inspection of the correlations between the four factors 
and established measures of attitudes toward nature provided 
evidence of the four-factor model’s convergent and 
discriminant validity.   
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Biologist Edward O. Wilson (1984) asserted that humans 
have an innate predisposition, which he called "biophilia," 
to connect with other forms of life, especially in ways that 
have proven advantageous from an evolutionary standpoint. 
Many scholars and researchers have pointed out human 
behaviors that ostensibly demonstrate the existence of 
biophilia. For example, Wilson (1984) noted that biophilia 
is evidenced by the "quickness and decisiveness with which 
[humans] learn particular things about certain kinds of 
plants and animals," a trait that Gardner (1999) called 
"naturalist intelligence" and described as a "fascination 
with plants and animals and a drive to identify, classify, 
and interact with them." Additionally, Ulrich (1993) argued 
that biophilia is indicated by the preference of modern 
humans for viewing natural landscapes over urban scenes.  
Feral (1998) and others asserted that observed therapeutic 
and salutary effects on modern humans of contact with nature 
supports claims regarding the existence of biophilia. 
However, only one researcher, Yale University’s Stephen R. 
Kellert, has attempted to create instrumentation to measure 
biophilia-related attitudes. In the early 1970s, Kellert 
began collecting data on the attitudes of Americans toward 
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animals, using instrumentation built around a typology of 
attitudes toward animals. In most of Kellert’s works, this 
typology of attitudes included the following dimensions: 
1) Dominionism, i.e., nature is meant to challenge 
humans and be mastered by humans;  
2) Ecologism/Scientism, i.e., nature is an intriguing 
system of interdependence among species and natural 
habitats, as well as a fascinating object of study; 
3) Humanism, i.e., nature provides humans with 
opportunities to fulfill emotional needs for 
bonding, intimacy, and companionship; 
4) Moralism, i.e., the natural world and its non-human 
inhabitants have moral standing and thus should not 
be exploited or abused; 
5) Naturalism, i.e., direct contact with nature, 
especially in unadulterated milieus, provides humans 
with emotional satisfaction;  
6) Negativism, i.e., nature is uncomfortable, 
disgusting, and/or dangerous; and 
7) Utilitarianism, i.e., nature is merely or primarily 
a resource for humans to utilize.  
Kellert continued collecting this data and refining his 
instrumentation across many studies (Kellert, 1974, 1976a, 
1976b, 1978, 1979, 1980, 1985, 1993b, 1993c, 2005; Kellert & 
Berry, 1981; Kellert & Westervelt, 1983) for the next two 
decades, eventually incorporating ideas about biophilia into 
his work and re-interpreting his earlier efforts in terms of 
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the construct biophilia. 
However, the results of Kellert’s instrumentation-
development efforts have been mixed and constrained by 
methodological limitations. For example, none of these 
studies report the extent to which Kellert’s instruments are 
correlated with other measures of similar constructs (i.e., 
convergent and discriminant validity evidence). Moreover, 
very few of the studies report the use of advanced 
statistical methods (e.g., factor-analytic techniques) to 
investigate the construct validity of the dimensions in 
Kellert’s typology. Finally, in nearly all the Kellert texts 
that discuss biophilia (Kellert, 1993a, 1996, 1997, 2002), 
the empirical evidence utilized to demonstrate the existence 
of biophilic values is actually data collected during 
earlier studies (Kellert, 1974, 1976a, 1979, 1993c; Kellert 
& Berry, 1981; Kellert & Westervelt, 1983) that had a much 
more limited focus, i.e., the measurement of attitudes 
toward animals only, excluding all other organisms that 
might be considered "wildlife" and all other phenomena that 
might be called "nature." Consequently, the data collected 
by Kellert constitutes very weak empirical support for his 
typology of biophilic attitudes.  
In the past decade, a small number of scholars have 
conducted empirical studies that employed Kellert’s typology 
(Drews, 2002; Thompson & Mintzes, 2002; Rauwald & Moore, 
2002; Barney et al., 2005; Lukas & Ross, 2005; Prokop & 
Kubiatko, 2008). These studies represented the first 
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technically sophisticated and reasonably transparent 
attempts to examine the dimensionality of Kellert’s 
typology. While these studies failed to confirm Kellert’s 
typology, they were too few in number and too limited in 
scope (e.g., focusing on only one species or on only the 
indigenous fauna of a small geographical area) to pose a 
serious challenge to Kellert’s ideas. As a result, before 
anything definitive can be stated regarding the soundness of 
Kellert’s theory, his typology needs to be tested 
empirically by studies that are at least as methodologically 
rigorous but broader in scope than those conducted in the 
last decade. 
For environmental educators, the administration of a 
reliable, stable, and valid instrument based on Kellert’s 
typology could yield results that aid in the planning and 
execution of lessons. With such results, the environmental-
education instructor could tailor some learning tasks to 
activate and thus capitalize upon students’ individual bio-
philic attitudes, which both Wilson and Kellert have asser-
ted are pre-programmed through the evolutionary experience 
of the human species and triggered by individual expe-
rience.1 Alternatively, results from the administration of 
                                                 
1This notion echoes to an extent the beliefs of sociocultu-
ral psychologists who assert that the capacity of students 
to absorb and process the information and skills is in no 
small part determined by previously acquired knowledge, 
skills, beliefs, and attitudes. However, whereas the socio-
cultural psychologists view learning as a predominantly an 
ontogenetic developmental process, Wilson’s and Kellert’s 
notions regarding biophilia suggest that phylogenetics also 
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such an instrument may alert the instructor to the presence, 
among his or her students, of potentially negative biophilic 
attitudes that may need to be inhibited lest they generate 
resistance to interference and thereby decrease the efficacy 
of learning tasks. These results would be especially useful 
if correlated with other measures of student attitudes 
toward the outdoors or nature-based experiences, such as the 
Ecocentric/Anthropocentric/Environmental Apathy Scale 
(Gagnon-Thompson & Barton, 1994), Environmental Motives 
Scale (Schultz, 2000), Revised New Ecological Paradigm Scale 
(Dunlap, et. al., 2000), Connectedness to Nature Scale 
(Mayer & McPherson-Frantz, 2004), and Nature Relatedness 
Scale (Nisbet, et. al., 2008). 
Consequently, this dissertation will focus on the 
construction and validation of a reliable, stable, and valid 
instrument that utilizes Kellert’s typology to measure 
biophilic attitudes but that does not suffer from the 
limitations of work completed by Kellert or his successors.  
Purpose of the Study 
 This study has three main purposes:   
1) Develop a Kellert-like instrument that fully repre-
sents (i.e., includes non-animal aspects of nature) 
the construct biophilia. This instrument will be 
called the Biophilic Attitudes Inventory (BAI); 
                                                                                                                                                 
play a significant role in the acquisition of beliefs, know-
ledge, and skills, as well as in our capacity and tendency 
to selectively attend to some types of stimuli and not to 
others. 
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2) Utilize appropriate data-analytic procedures to 
investigate the BAI’s dimensionality; and 
3) Collect convergent and discriminant evidence2 for 
the BAI’s validity by examining the extent to which 
the BAI correlates with well-established measures 
of environmental attitudes. 
To serve the aforementioned purposes, this study will pose 
and answer four research questions, which are stated below.  
Research Questions 
The research questions addressed in this study are: 
1) Can a reliable, stable, and valid measure of 
biophilic attitudes be developed based on Kellert’s 
7 dimensions? 
2) Will the instrument’s (i.e, the BAI’s) dimensiona-
lity confirm or fail to confirm Kellert’s typology? 
3) If Kellert’s typology is not confirmed, how might 
biophilia be reconceptualized based on the results 
of the data analysis conducted in this study? 
4) Does the instrument (i.e., the BAI) and/or its 
respective subscales correlate in expected ways 
with other well-established measures of 
environmental attitudes? 
To answer these questions, I will collect data and use it to 
                                                 
2
 Strong correlations in expected ways between a new scale 
and measures of related constructs constitute convergent 
evidence of the new scale’s validity. Non- or weak 
correlations between a new scale and measures of unrelated 
constructs constitute discriminant evidence of the new 
scale’s validity (Furr & Bacharach, 2008).  
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assess the plausibility of the two competing hypotheses 
(i.e., the full-model versus reduced-model) I discuss below. 
Hypotheses 
I will compare two hypotheses which I call the full-
model hypothesis and the reduced-model hypothesis.  The 
former hypothesis states that biophilia, as measured by the 
BAI, includes seven dimensions.  The latter hypothesis 
states that biophilia has two dimensions. 
The full-model hypothesis that will be tested in this 
study is: 
1) Biophilia, as measured by the BAI, has seven 
dimensions: 
a) Dominionism;  
b) Ecologism/Scientism; 
c) Humanism; 
d) Moralism; 
e) Naturalism;  
f) Negativism; and 
g) Utilitarianism.  
2) If the seven-dimension structure of BAI is confir-
med, the BAI subscales will correlate significantly 
with other measures of environmental attitudes in 
expected ways (cf., Table 7).  
The reduced-model hypothesis that will be tested in 
this study is: 
1) Biophilia, as measured by the BAI, has two 
dimensions: 
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a) Biophilia, i.e., nature is beneficial to the 
intellectual and emotional development of 
humans and deserves to be held in high regard.  
b) Biophobia, i.e., nature is frequently a 
nuisance, obstacle, or threat to humans and has 
value only to the extent it can be controlled 
and thereby exploited.  
In this scenario, BAI items previously associated 
with Ecologism/Scientism, Humanism, Moralism, and 
Naturalism will load on Biophilia. BAI items pre-
viously associated with Dominionism, Negativism, and 
Utilitarianism will load on Biophobia. These beliefs 
may be related to fears of nature or outdoor expe-
riences described by Orr (1993), Ulrich (1993), and 
Wilson (1993).  
2) In the two-dimension structure, the Biophilia and 
Biophobia subscales will correlate significantly 
with other measures of environmental attitudes in 
expected ways (cf., Table 8). 
Benefits to the Research Literature 
This study will contribute to the research literature 
by providing a methodologically rigorous test of Kellert’s 
typology. Thus, the results of this study can contribute to 
the case for or against the validity of Kellert’s theory. 
Moreover, as previously mentioned, the results of this study 
may aid in the development of a stable environmental-
attitudes assessment based on Kellert’s work.   
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CHAPTER 2 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Overview 
Biologist Edward O. Wilson (1984) asserted that humans 
have an innate predisposition, which he called biophilia, to 
connect with other forms of life. Many scholars and 
researchers have pointed out human behaviors that ostensibly 
demonstrate the existence of biophilia (Faber-Taylor, et 
al., 1998, 2001; Feral, 1998; Frumkin, 2001; Gathright, 
Yamada, & Morita, 2006; Heerwagen & Orians, 1993; Katcher & 
Wilkins, 1993; Kuo & Faber-Taylor, 2004; Lawrence, 1993; 
Morita, et al., 2007; Townsend, 2006; Ulrich, et al., 1991; 
Ulrich, 1993; Velarde, Fry, & Tveit, 2007; Wells & Evans, 
2003; Wilson, 1984, 1993). However, only one researcher, 
Stephen R. Kellert, has attempted to create instrumentation 
to measure biophilia-related attitudes (Kellert, 1974, 
1976a, 1976b, 1978, 1979, 1980, 1985, 1993b, 1993c, 2005; 
Kellert & Berry, 1981; Kellert & Westervelt, 1983), and the 
results of his efforts have been mixed. Consequently, this 
dissertation will focus on the development of a reliable, 
stable, and valid measure of biophilia-related attitudes. 
 The literature review for this dissertation begins with 
a description of biophilia as it has been conceptualized by 
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biologist Edward O. Wilson (who coined the term "biophilia") 
and others. Then, the review focuses on the many efforts of 
Kellert to develop instrumentation to measure biophilia, 
beginning in the early 1970s and continuing through 2005, 
and discusses the strengths and weaknesses of Kellert’s 
work. Next, the review examines published studies by other 
researchers who utilized and adapted Kellert’s typology of 
biophilic attitudes (Thompson & Mintzes, 2002; Rauwald & 
Moore, 2002; Drews, 2002; Lukas & Ross, 2005; Barney et al., 
2005; Prokop & Kubiatko, 2008), focusing particularly on the 
ways in which these researchers addressed (and failed to 
address) some of the deficiencies in Kellert’s work. 
Additionally, the review describes how the shortcomings in 
Kellert’s work and the work of his successors requires 
further efforts to develop and validate an instrument with 
items that fully represent the construct biophilia. Finally, 
the review specifies the research questions to be addressed 
and the hypotheses to be tested in this dissertation. 
 This literature review’s predominant and narrow focus 
on Kellert and other researchers who have adapted Kellert’s 
typology is deliberate because this dissertation is essen-
tially an exercise in scale development. The first step in 
the development of any scale is to identify the boundaries 
of the phenomena that the scale will attempt to measure 
(DeVellis, 2003). To accomplish this task, scale developers 
typically look to relevant theory and to prior efforts of 
other researchers to define and measure the phenomena.   
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What is Biophilia? 
 Biologist Edward O. Wilson (1984) asserted that humans 
have an innate predisposition, which he called biophilia, to 
connect with other forms of life. Wilson claimed that 
evidence for the existence of biophilia was ubiquitous: 
[Biophilia] unfolds in the predictable fantasies and 
responses of individuals from early childhood onward. 
It cascades into repetitive patterns of culture across 
most or all societies, a consistency often noted in the 
literature of anthropology. These processes appear to 
be part of the programs of the brain . . . They are too 
consistent to be dismissed as the result of purely 
historical events working on a mental blank slate 
(Wilson, 1984). 
Wilson (1993) describes biophilia as "not a single instinct 
but a complex set of learning rules" that shape human 
behavioral responses to environmental phenomena, influencing 
the extent to which such phenomena generate feelings of awe, 
indifference, attraction, aversion, serenity, anxiety, and 
so on. Consequently, biophilia is a multidimensional concept 
that includes both positive and negative components. As 
Sagan and Margulis (1993) observe, "there is no simple 
biophilia, no unconditional, unchanging love for members of 
other species . . . the presence of biophilia suggests we 
not only love birds and flowers but also have an inbred 
contempt, distaste, and perhaps even hatred of certain other 
life forms." What Wilson and others call biophilia (which 
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literally means "love of life") might be more appropriately 
described as prototaxis: "the generalized tendency of cells 
and organisms to react to each other in distinct ways" 
(Sagan & Margulis, 1993). Nevertheless, this document will 
use the term biophilia since it is by far the most commonly 
used descriptor for the phenomenon that is the focus of this 
inquiry. 
From an evolutionary standpoint, biophilia promoted 
successful adaptation to environmental conditions across the 
hundreds of millennia that humans lived exclusively as 
hunter-gatherers in close association with nature. In other 
words, individuals and groups most influenced by biophilic 
rules were also most likely to survive and propagate, 
thereby genetically and culturally transmitting these rules 
to future generations (Wilson, 1993).   
Wilson (1993) asserts that biophilia has not been 
eradicated in the 8,000 to 10,000 years since people began 
living in stationary villages and tilling the soil nor in 
the few centuries since people began re-locating en masse to 
urban and suburban habitats: "[Biophilic rules] persist from 
generation to generation, atrophied and fitfully manifested 
in the artificial new environments into which technology has 
catapulted humanity." According to Wilson and others, 
present-day manifestations of biophilia in humans include 
the: 
 "quickness and decisiveness with which [humans] 
learn particular things about certain kinds of 
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plants and animals" (Wilson, 1984), a trait that 
Gardner (1999) called "naturalist intelligence" and 
described as a "fascination with plants and animals 
and a drive to identify, classify, and interact 
with them"; 
 Fears and phobias that modern humans (i.e., 
information-age humans in industrialized nations) 
exhibit of natural phenomena (e.g., snakes, 
spiders, darkness) that posed a constant threat to 
people in prehistoric eras (Ulrich, 1993; Wilson, 
1993); 
 Omnipresence of serpents as prominent and powerful 
agents in the mythologies of nearly all human 
cultures (Wilson, 1993); 
 Widespread use of animals as symbols in human 
language and literature (Lawrence, 1993); 
 Attraction of modern humans to open spaces with 
lush vegetation, scattered trees, and conspicuous 
water features, resembling the savannas of east 
Africa, where humans originated and evolved 
(Heerwagen & Orians, 1993; Ulrich, 1993);  
 Aversion of modern humans toward closed spaces, 
which in the prehistoric era would have hidden 
predators and hostile conspecifics and would have 
presented human quarry with limited avenues for 
escape (Heerwagen & Orians, 1993; Ulrich, 1993); 
 Preference of modern humans for viewing natural 
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landscapes over urban scenes (Ulrich, 1993); 
 Stress-reducing and restoration effects on modern 
humans of visiting, or even just viewing, non-
threatening, natural settings or water features 
(Frumkin, 2001; Gathright, Yamada, & Morita, 2006; 
Katcher & Wilkins, 1993; Morita, et al., 2007; 
Ulrich, et al., 1991; Ulrich, 1993; Velarde, Fry, & 
Tveit, 2007; Wells & Evans, 2003); 
 Therapeutic and salutary effects on modern humans 
of contact with nature (Feral, 1998; Frumkin, 2001; 
Katcher & Wilkins, 1993; Kuo & Faber-Taylor, 2004; 
Townsend, 2006; Velarde, Fry, & Tveit, 2007); and 
 Enhancement of creativity, mental discipline, and 
higher-level cognitive functioning in modern humans 
associated with exposure to nature (Faber-Taylor, 
et al., 1998, 2001; Ulrich, 1993). 
The consensus among biophilia researchers is that the 
phenomenon, while innate, is not uniformly manifested across 
the species. Rather, the extent to which and manner in which 
an individual exhibits biophilia is dependent on the 
environmental stimuli and cultural conditioning to which he 
or she is exposed. Kellert (2005) describes the components 
of biophilia as "‘weak’ biological, or inherent, tendencies 
that are greatly influenced by learning and experience 
within a cultural and community context." Concurring with 
Kellert and with Wilson’s (1993) comment that biophilic 
programming can be "mediated by rules of prepared or 
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counterprepared learning," Nabhan and St. Antoine (1993) 
note: 
. . . a child’s learning environment greatly conditions 
the expression of any genetic basis for biophilia. 
Unless the appropriate environmental triggers are 
present in a certain cultural/environmental context, 
biophilia is unlikely to be fully expressed . . . 
Biophilia, then, may take on different shapes and 
shades in its expression within various cultures and 
individuals, depending on the degree of exposure to and 
engagement with other organisms.  
In contrast, the determinants of biophobia, which Orr 
(1993) defines as the "culturally acquired urge to affiliate 
with technology, human artifacts, and solely with human 
interests regarding the natural world," are mostly extrinsic 
to human nature. Orr (1993) notes that biophobia is 
"increasingly common among people raised with television, 
Walkman radios attached to their heads, video games, living 
amidst shopping malls, freeways, and dense urban or suburban 
settings where nature is permitted tastefully, as 
decoration." According to Orr, biophobic individuals often 
feel "[discomfort] with the nature that lies beyond [their] 
direct control," sometimes exhibit "active scorn for 
whatever is not man-made, managed, or air-conditioned," and 
frequently "regard nature ‘objectively’ as nothing more than 
‘resources’ to be used any way the favored among the present 
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generation see fit."3 Pierre-Louis (2010) concurs, conceding 
that some aspects of biophobia may be innate (e.g., the fear 
of snakes exhibited by humans and most primates) but noting 
that “most of our biophobia is a learned condition - think 
of the stereotype of the unsettled city slicker when facing 
their first evening in the great outdoors, or the way many 
lawn care commercials are about ‘taming the outdoors.’”  
How Has Biophilia Been Measured? 
The only researcher to attempt the systematic 
measurement of biophilia-related attitudes is Stephen R. 
Kellert. Beginning in the early 1970’s, Kellert collected 
voluminous amounts of data in the long-term development and 
refinement of a typology of attitudes toward nature 
(Kellert, 1974, 1976a, 1976b, 1978, 1979, 1985; Kellert & 
Berry, 1980; Kellert & Westervelt, 1983). This typology 
later evolved in response to Wilson’s biophilia hypothesis 
(Kellert, 1993a, 1993b, 1993c, 1996, 1997, 2002, 2005). 
Kellert’s typology, which in his post-1993 publications is 
described as a "typology of values" rather than a "typology 
of attitudes," includes up to 10 components. The eight 
components examined across most of Kellert’s publications, 
as well as a brief description of each component, appear in 
Table 1. 
                                                 
3 Ulrich (1993) also used the term biophobia, but he did so 
to describe biophilia’s negative components--the "over time 
remembered, negative/avoidance responses" to "dangers asso-
ciated with natural settings"--that provided humans with an 
adaptive advantage as they evolved during the prehistoric 
era.  
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Table 1 
Kellert’s Typology of Biophilic Attitudes/Values  
Attitude/Value Description
Naturalism  Nature is a venue for exploration and first-hand 
discovery. 
Humanism  Nature provides emotional satisfaction. 
Moralism  Nature is inherently valuable and should be 
preserved. 
Dominionism  Nature is meant for humans to control. 
Utilitarianism  Nature is a reservoir of material resources for 
humans. 
Negativism  Nature is dirty, dangerous, and/or scary. 
Ecologism  Nature is a fascinating system of interrelated 
processes. 
Scientism  Nature is an object worthy of empirical study. 
 
 
Kellert asserts that each of the attitudes/values described 
in Table 1, is an aspect of human affiliation with nature. 
Moreover, Keller contends that each attitude/value, as it 
was manifested during prehistoric times, provided humans 
with an adaptive advantage that permitted them to survive 
and propagate. 
Kellert’s Empirical Studies of Attitudes toward Animals  
Kellert’s research program to measure biophilic 
attitudes began, oddly enough, more than a decade before the 
publication of Wilson’s Biophilia (1984). With financial 
support from the Fish and Wildlife Service of the U.S. 
Department of the Interior, Kellert (1974) conducted an 
investigation into American attitudes toward animals, 
prompted by the "continuing importance of animals in modern 
society" and by what he claimed was a lack of any systematic 
effort to arrive at "some integrated understanding of 
[human-animal relationships]." According to Kellert (1974), 
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an attitude "encompasses feelings and beliefs, i.e., an 
affective and a cognitive component . . . [that] are 
generally directed toward choice and decision-making and, 
therefore [sic] involve elements of perception and 
motivational force." Moreover, Kellert stated that  
One’s basic feelings and beliefs about animals . . . 
largely determine the direction and degree of one’s 
involvement with animals, and not vice versa . . . 
Thus, before a person became involved in a given animal 
activity, there were probably certain underlying 
attitudes toward animals which motivated and directed 
his or her specific area of interest.   
Consequently, to gather data regarding American attitudes 
toward animals, Kellert (1974) conducted personal, in-depth 
interviews with 61 individuals (12 women and 49 men with a 
mean age of 45) from 20 different states who were known to 
have "a significant level of interest of involvement with 
animals" and who had "already established well-defined, 
though perhaps exaggerated, views on animals." Kellert 
selected this small, non-probabilistic sample because he 
believed that from "a study population of people who were 
deeply involved with animals, certain basic attitudinal 
types would hopefully stand out in greater relief, and would 
in turn be applicable to the views of the general public." 
Each interview was divided into four parts: 
1. Unstructured section with open-ended questions 
regarding sample members’ "background experiences with 
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animals." 
2. Unstructured section "focused on [sample member’s] 
current animal activities" and "[consisting] largely of 
in-depth probes regarding attitudes, opinions, skills, 
primary satisfactions and interests involving animals." 
3. Structured section containing 24 three-point (i.e., 
agree, neutral, disagree), Likert-scale items regarding 
"animal-related issues" (e.g., "Pets represent, for me, 
one of the major sources of satisfaction in life.") and 
18 such items focused on "social and philosophical 
topics" (e.g., "War is inherent in human nature.").4  
4. Structured section containing mostly close-ended 
"demographic and life style questions."  
Based on a qualitative analysis5 of the interview data, 
Kellert (1974) developed a typology of seven attitudinal 
orientations (i.e., Naturalistic, Ecologistic, Humanistic, 
Moralistic, Scientistic, Aesthetic, and Dominionistic), each 
of which comprised "a set of overlapping and interrelated 
beliefs and feelings" about animals. For example, according 
                                                 
4
 Kellert (1974) notes that, during an earlier pilot study, 
"using such techniques as factor and content analysis" 
revealed that these 42 items were "the most relevant, 
significant and differentiating of people’s attitudes." 
However, Kellert did not provide any detailed information 
regarding the aforementioned analyses.   
5
 Kellert (1974) provides little detail regarding the 
qualitative analysis that yielded the typology, other than 
stating that the typology was largely a "theoretical and 
subjective construction . . . formulated after lengthy 
discussions with the [sample members], repeated examinations 
of the interview transcripts, and extensive readings of both 
professional and lay readings on the subject of man and 
animals." 
 20 
to Kellert, a person with the "Naturalistic" attitudinal 
orientation would be very interested in direct contact with 
nature, feel affection for wildlife, believe in the 
superiority of the natural over built environments, be 
strongly interested in hunting-and-gathering activities that 
can be described as "living off the land," and view death as 
a natural process. Kellert (1974) was careful to note that 
rarely would any single individual manifest all the beliefs 
and feelings associated with a particular attitudinal 
orientation. Moreover, Kellert observed that very few 
individuals would be adequately described by one attitudinal 
orientation only. However, Kellert observed that most 
persons have a dominant orientation that can be identified. 
After developing the typology, Kellert (1974) assigned 
to each sample member (n=61) at least one primary 
attitudinal orientation (PAO) based on a content analysis of 
that person’s responses to the first and second sections of 
the interview. One or more secondary attitude orientations 
(SAOs) were also assigned to some sample members.6  
To investigate the validity of the typology, Kellert 
(1974) conducted a multiple discriminant function analysis 
(MFDA) using data from the 58 persons assigned only one PAO 
as a result of the previously described content analysis. In 
this MFDA, Kellert designated the items from third and 
                                                 
6
 Fifty-seven sample members were assigned one PAO; three, 
were assigned two PAOs. Twenty-eight sample members were 
assigned one SAO; 33, were assigned two SAOs. The total 
number of PAO assignments was 64; the total number of SAO 
assignments, 94. 
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fourth parts of the interview as independent variables and 
designated PAO as the dependent variable. After retaining 
the 20 most discriminating interview items in the MFDA, 
Kellert found that 97% of sample members were correctly 
classified, i.e., assigned to the same group by the MFDA as 
they had been in the content analysis. Additionally, Kellert 
provided a canonical discriminant function graph that 
visually demonstrated that, except for the ecologistically 
oriented, a definite distinctiveness and independence exists 
among the attitudinal orientations. To be sure, the results 
of Kellert (1974) should be viewed with some skepticism 
since the researcher neglected to provide many key pieces of 
information. For example, Kellert did not report means and 
standard deviations for any of the interview items, Wilks’ 
lambda, degrees of freedom, or group centroids. Likewise, 
Kellert did not supply a structure matrix for each 
discriminant function. Nevertheless, Kellert was able to 
replicate statistically with one data set (i.e., responses 
to the close-ended items in the third and fourth parts of 
the interview) the group assignments that he had made 
qualitatively with a different data set (i.e., the responses 
to the open-ended items in the first and second parts of the 
interview), a feat that suggests that his typology of 
attitudinal orientations toward animals has validity. 
Kellert (1976a) and Kellert (1976b) describe a follow-
up study to Kellert (1974) in which the researcher utilized 
the typology of attitudinal orientations toward animals to 
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design, pre-test, and ultimately administer (via a 45-minute 
interview) a close-ended, structured questionnaire to 553 
residents of randomly selected geographical units (e.g., 
city blocks) throughout the United States. The goal of this 
study was to "determine the distribution of [the attitudinal 
orientations identified in the Kellert (1974)] within the 
American public." Kellert (1976a) reports that the 
questionnaire was divided into four sections: 1) attitudes 
toward animals; 2) knowledge of animals; 3) activities 
involving animals; and 4) social and personal 
characteristics of the questionnaire respondents. The 67 
"attitudes toward animals" items that appeared on the 
Kellert (1976a; 1976b) questionnaire were selected from an 
initial pool of more than 1,000 items that were generated 
from inspection and analysis of interview data collected for 
Kellert (1974). The "attitudes toward animals" items 
encompassed a wide swath of wildlife-related issues, 
including: 
endangered species, wildlife preservation, hunting, 
trapping, zoos, training of animals, killing of animals 
for their furs, killing of animals for meat, medical 
experimentation, predator control, pet relationships, 
extermination of pests, vivisection, destruction versus 
preservation of wildlife habitat, spiritual 
relationships to animals and the natural world, 
trapping, liking and disliking of animals, harvesting 
surplus of wild game, rodeos, bullfighting, 
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cockfighting, dog fighting, scientific study of 
animals, fear of animals, horse racing, superstition 
connected with animals, utilitarian exploitation of 
animals, and miscellaneous other topics. (Kellert, 
1976a) 
However, for purposes of the questionnaire, the definition 
of the word "animal" was restricted to birds and mammals 
"because attitudes toward insects, reptiles and fish are 
often different from attitudes toward mammals and birds." 
 Cluster analysis of pilot data was utilized to both 
select the final 67 "attitudes toward animals" items for the 
questionnaire and to assign each item to one of nine 
attitude scales: naturalistic, ecologistic, humanistic, 
moralistic, scientistic, aesthetic, dominionistic, 
utilitarian, and negativistic (Kellert, 1976a). The former 
six scales were conceptually the same as their namesakes in 
Kellert (1974). However, the seventh scale, dominionistic, 
was redefined in Kellert (1976a, 1976b) to mean merely an 
"interest in mastering and controlling animals"; an eighth 
scale, utilitarian, was added to describe an "interest based 
largely on how animals may practically and material benefit 
human beings"; and a ninth scale, negativism, was added to 
describe "indifference, dislike and fear of animals ... a 
fundamental sense of separation and alienation from the 
animal and natural world."  
Unfortunately, Kellert (1976a) reports no statistics 
associated with the aforementioned cluster analysis; instead 
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the document includes an appendix with a generic description 
of cluster analysis as a class of data-analytic techniques. 
Moreover, Kellert (1976a) provides no reliability 
coefficients for the overall "attitudes toward animals" 
questionnaire nor for any of the individual attitude scales. 
Each scale ultimately contained between 6 and 15 items, 
with some items appearing on more than one scale. Each item 
was structured as a declarative statement (e.g., "I think 
circuses tend to degrade and humiliate animals.") to which 
the respondents were asked to indicate agreement or 
disagreement using a five-point, Likert scale with the 
following point descriptors: Strongly Agree, Slightly Agree, 
Slightly Disagree, Strongly Disagree, and No Opinion). 
  For eight of the nine scales, a respondent’s score was 
derived solely from his or her weighted responses to 
questionnaire items associated with the scale. "Strongly 
Agree" responses (and "Strongly Disagree" responses on 
reverse coded items) were assigned a weight of 2, while 
"Slightly Agree" responses (and "Slightly Disagree" 
responses on reverse coded items) were assigned a weight of 
"1". However, four points were added to the scientistic 
score of all respondents who performed exceptionally well 
(i.e., in the top 25%) on a 24-item, true-or-false 
"knowledge quiz," a procedure that Kellert (1976a) claimed 
was justified because "considerable factual knowledge of 
animals is an intrinsic aspect of the scientistic attitude." 
Kellert (1976a) reports high correlations (i.e., r 
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greater than 0.5) between the following attitude categories: 
dominionistic and utilitarian, naturalistic and ecologistic, 
naturalistic and scientistic, moralistic and humanistic, and 
moralistic and ecologistic. Kellert (1976a) reports moderate 
correlations (i.e., r greater than 0.3) between the 
following attitude categories: dominionistic and 
negativistic, utilitarian and negativistic, moralistic and 
naturalistic, humanistic and naturalistic, and scientistic 
and ecologistic. (Correlational coefficients for the 
aesthetic attitude scale were not reported.) However, any 
interpretation of these coefficients must be approached with 
caution, as Kellert (1976a) does not report the results on 
any significance tests. Moreover, the magnitudes of some of 
these correlational coefficients are inflated due to items 
being shared between the scales. For example, the strength 
of the direct relationship between the moralistic and the 
ecologistic scales (r=0.6344) is suspect because the scales 
share two items that are worded, coded, and weighted 
identically. Similarly, the strength of the inverse 
relationship between the naturalistic and negativistic 
scales appears questionable because the scales share three 
items that are worded and weighted identically and coded in 
opposite directions. 
Kellert (1976b) notes that, for purposes of 
ascertaining differences in the prevalence of the 
aforementioned attitudes among various groups represented in 
the sample, only six of the attitude types could be 
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examined, explaining that "indices of the aesthetic, 
scientistic and, to a lesser degree, ecologistic attitudes 
were not particularly reliable or valid." Still, Kellert 
(1976b) does not describe how the reliability or validity of 
any of the attitude indices was investigated beyond stating 
they "were created largely by examining the results of a 
statistical technique referred to as cluster analysis." 
Kellert (1978) utilizes the same dataset as Kellert 
(1976a) and Kellert (1976b). However, Kellert (1978) focuses 
only on the portion (i.e., 37%) of the original dataset who 
identified themselves as hunters (operationally defined as 
"anyone who had hunted at any point in life, regardless of 
reason or frequency") or anti-hunters. Furthermore, Kellert 
(1978) employs the "attitudes towards animals" typology from 
Kellert (1974) and Kellert (1976a) to describe hunters and 
anti-hunters. However, the typology in Kellert (1978) 
contains an additional scale, neutralism, which the 
researcher defines as "a passive avoidance of animals due 
either to indifference or lack of concern" and notes that 
"in the original research analysis and in this paper the 
neutralistic and negativistic attitudes are treated together 
as a single attitude." 
Much like Kellert (1976a), Kellert (1978) provides no 
reliability coefficients for the overall "attitudes toward 
animals" questionnaire nor for any of the individual 
attitude scales. The researcher notes that "scales measuring 
most of the attitude types were developed using such 
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statistical techniques as cluster, multiple discriminant and 
correlational analyses." However, the researcher provides no 
statistical results from these analyses, nor does he report 
re-running any of these analyses on the sub-sample data 
(i.e., hunters and anti-hunters only) that are the focus of 
the article. 
Kellert (1979) describes the administration of a 65-
item "attitudes toward animals" questionnaire to a sample of 
3,107 randomly selected adults in the United States. The 
author claimed that "cluster and other correlational 
analyses were employed" to construct eight "attitudes toward 
animals" scales. However, the researcher provides no 
statistical results from these analyses. The eight scales--
naturalistic, ecologistic, humanistic, moralistic, 
scientistic, utilitarian, dominionistic, and negativistic--
were conceptually the same as their namesakes in Kellert 
(1976a). In support of the claim that the eight scales were 
independent, Kellert (1979) noted that correlations between 
the scales were small, i.e. less than 0.4 in magnitude. 
However, Kellert (1979) does not include the wording of the 
items or the response options, does not specify the number 
of response options, does not identify how many items are 
included in each scale, and does not establish the extent to 
which the same items are utilized in more than one scale. 
Consequently, it is difficult to draw any firm conclusions 
from the interscale correlations reported in Kellert (1979). 
Moreover, Kellert (1979) does not report any reliability 
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coefficients for the overall "attitudes toward animals" 
questionnaire nor for any of the individual attitude scales. 
Kellert and Berry (1980) provides additional 
information about the data and instrumentation first 
described in Kellert (1979). For example, Kellert and Berry 
(1980) specifies the number of items associated with each 
"attitudes toward animals" scale; specifies the scoring 
range for each scale; notes that each questionnaire item 
required respondents to utilize a six-point, Likert-scale, 
ranging from "Strongly Agree" to "Strongly Disagree"; and 
provides the exact wording of a small number of 
questionnaire items, which are shown in Table 2. 
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Table 2 
Sample Items from "Attitudes toward Animals" Questionnaire in 
Kellert and Berry (1980)  
Attitude Scale Questionnaire Item
Negativistic  I dislike most beetles and spiders. 
I think rats and cockroaches should be eliminated. 
Humanistic I think love is an emotion which people should feel 
only for other people, not for animals. 
I have owned pets that were as dear to me as another 
person. 
Moralistic  I see nothing wrong with using steel traps to capture 
wild animals. 
Zoos should provide more natural conditions for their 
animals even if this means much higher entrance fees. 
Scientistic  I have little desire to study vertebrate zoology or 
population genetics. 
I have little interest in learning the taxonomic 
classification of animals. 
Utilitarian  A dog trained at a task, like herding sheep, is 
generally a better dog than one owned just for 
companionship. 
I approve of building on marshes that ducks and other 
non-endangered wildlife use if the marshes are needed 
for housing development. 
Dominionistic I admire a person who works hard to shoot a big 
trophy animal like a 600-pound bear. 
I think a person sometimes has to beat a horse or dog 
to get it to obey orders properly. 
 
 
Kellert and Berry (1980) asserts that the eight scales "were 
developed as a result of cluster and item-to-item 
correlational analyses." However, the authors do not report 
any of the statistics that resulted from these analyses. 
     Kellert (1980) was a recapitulation of Kellert (1979) 
and Kellert and Berry (1980), utilizing the same data set 
but reporting no additional information about the 
construction or validation of the "attitudes toward animals" 
questionnaire or its scales. Discussing the same dataset as 
Kellert (1979), Kellert (1980), and Kellert and Berry 
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(1980), Kellert (1993b) notes that "attitude scales were 
constructed based on cluster and factor analyses that 
identified 4-9 questions as measures of the underlying 
attitude type" but does not provide any statistics from 
these analyses. Kellert (1993b) also reports that each of 
the "attitudes toward animals" scales yielded Cronbach’s 
alpha values between 0.78 and 0.92. 
Prior to 1983, all of Kellert’s work in the development 
of an "attitudes toward animals" typology utilized adults as 
subjects. In contrast, Kellert and Westervelt (1983) and 
Kellert (1985) focused on children ages 6 to 18. As a 
sample, this study utilized a group of 267 randomly selected 
children who attended 16 randomly selected public schools in 
Connecticut. After pre-testing potential "attitudes toward 
animals" items with 50 children within the aforementioned 
age range, the research team developed three versions of the 
questionnaire: one version for administration to second 
graders; a second version, for fifth and eighth graders; and 
a third, for eleventh graders (Kellert and Westervelt, 
1983). 
From the questionnaire items, the research team 
constructed eight "attitudes toward animals" scales. The 
eight scales--naturalistic, ecologistic, humanistic, 
moralistic, scientistic, utilitarian, dominionistic, and 
negativistic--were conceptually the same as their namesakes 
in Kellert (1976a), Kellert (1976b), and Kellert (1979). 
However, the researchers do not supply any information 
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regarding how questionnaire items were assigned to the 
scales.  
The exact number of items that appeared on the Kellert 
and Westervelt (1983) questionnaire is unclear, as the 
researchers did not provide a complete list of items in 
their report. Moreover, regarding the number of items on the 
questionnaire, the information in the Methodology section of 
the Kellert and Westervelt (1983) report and in Kellert 
(1985) is somewhat nebulous and incongruent. On pages 18-19 
of the Kellert and Westervelt (1983) report, the authors 
state: 
... a number of methodologies, including a film test, 
were designed to assess children’s attitudes toward 
animals. Twenty-seven attitude questions were asked at 
the beginning of the interview and 27 more after the 
film was projected ... In order to determine the 
presence and relative strength of the nine attitude 
types, attitude scales were designed from the 54 
attitude questions  
However, on page 20, the authors state: 
The film was shown to each child . . . and during pro-
jection interviewers administered an 87-item attitude 
questionnaire ... Twenty-seven questions were included 
in the attitude scales ... The remaining sixty items 
served to focus attention on critical film segments, 
stimulate reflection, and sustain interest in the film. 
Finally, about the same study, Kellert (1985) states: 
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Fifty-four questions were used for measuring the eight 
attitude scales. Additionally, a thirty-minute film, 
and an accompanying 87-item questionnaire, were created 
to provide a less structured and more visually 
sensitive test of animals toward animals. 
While neither Kellert and Westervelt (1983) nor Kellert 
(1985) specifies the number of items and the scoring ranges 
associated with most of the "attitudes toward animals" 
scales, Kellert and Westervelt (1983) does note that many of 
the questionnaire items required respondents to utilize a 
four-point, Likert-scale, ranging from "Strongly Agree" to 
"Strongly Disagree." The researchers also provide the exact 
wording of a small number of these items, which are shown in 
Table 3. 
 
Table 3 
Sample Items from "Attitudes toward Animals"Questionnaire 
(Four-Point Likert Scale) in Kellert and Westervelt (1983)  
Attitude Scale Questionnaire Item
Negativistic Most wild animals are dangerous to people. 
I don’t like most animals close to me. 
Naturalistic I like pet animals like dogs and cats more than I 
like wild animals. 
If I went camping, I would want to stay where lots 
of other people were, not where wild animals were 
around. 
Moralistic It’s OK to hunt whales for food as long as there are 
a lot of them left in the world. 
It’s OK to kill an animal and use its fur to make a 
coat. 
Utilitarian If they found oil where wild animals lived, we would 
have to get the oil, even if it harmed the animals. 
Dominionistic All dogs should be very strictly trained so they do 
everything their owners tell them to do. 
Sometimes people must beat a horse or dog hard to 
make it do what they want. 
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Unlike in Kellert (1976a), Kellert (1979), and Kellert 
and Berry (1980), the "attitudes toward animals" 
questionnaire discussed in Kellert and Westervelt (1983) and 
Kellert (1985) was not exclusively comprised of Likert-scale 
items. For example, some questionnaire items employed a two-
point, dichotomous scale, as shown in Table 4. 
 
Table 4 
Sample Items from "Attitudes toward Animals"Questionnaire 
(Two-Point "Yes/No" Scale) in Kellert and Westervelt (1983)  
Attitude Scale Questionnaire Item
Ecologistic Is it wrong for animals to kill and eat other animals? 
Would it be better if animals didn’t kill other 
animals and ate plants instead? 
 
 
In other cases, subjects were asked to use a four-point 
scale  to indicate the extent to which they "liked" (Liked a 
Lot, Liked a Little, Disliked a Little, and Disliked a Lot)  
viewing a segment of the film associated with a particular 
"attitudes toward animals" subscale (Kellert and Westervelt, 
1983). However, neither Kellert and Westervelt (1983) nor 
Kellert (1985) provide any information regarding how scores 
from different types of items were weighted and combined to 
create scale scores for each respondent. 
In support of the claim that the eight scales were 
independent, Kellert and Westervelt (1983) and Kellert 
(1985) noted that correlations between the scales were 
small, i.e. less than 0.3 in magnitude in nearly all 
instances. However, Kellert and Westervelt (1983) provides 
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only limited information about the wording and response 
options and does not establish the extent to which the same 
items are utilized in more than one scale. Consequently, it 
is difficult to draw any firm conclusions from the 
interscale correlations reported in Kellert and Westervelt 
(1983). Moreover, neither Kellert and Westervelt (1983) nor 
Kellert (1985) report any reliability coefficients for the 
overall "attitudes toward animals" questionnaire or for any 
of the individual attitude scales. 
Kellert (1993c) describes the administration of an 
"attitudes toward invertebrates" questionnaire to 214 adult 
residents of Connecticut. The researchers report the deve-
lopment of eight scales (negativistic, aesthetic, utilita-
rian, ecologistic, naturalistic, scientistic, moralistic, 
and humanistic) that, with the exception of the aesthetic 
scale, were conceptually similar to their namesakes that 
appear in earlier studies (Kellert, 1976a; Kellert, 1976b; 
Kellert, 1979; Kellert and Berry, 1980; Kellert and Wester-
velt, 1983). Kellert (1993c) provides the first encountered 
report of the successful development of a scale for aesthe-
tic, which is defined as "Primary interest in the physical 
attractiveness and symbolic appeal of invertebrates." 
Kellert (1993c) notes that each scale contained 3-9 
items, but the researcher does not reveal the exact number 
of items on each scale nor the total number of items on the 
"attitudes toward invertebrates" questionnaire. Similarly, 
while Kellert (1993c) states that "the scales were 
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constructed based on cluster and factor analysis results" 
and that "correlational findings indicated that the scales 
were relatively independent of one another," the researcher 
does not provide any statistics to support these assertions. 
Finally, Kellert (1993c) does not report any reliability 
coefficients for the overall "attitudes toward animals" 
questionnaire or for any of the individual attitude scales. 
Kellert’s Biophilic "Values" or "Tendencies" or "Dimensions" 
 Kellert first discusses biophilia in 1993 in an essay 
entitled "The Biological Basis for Human Values of Nature" 
that appears in the book The Biophilia Hypothesis (Kellert, 
1993a). Kellert co-edited the book with Edward O. Wilson, 
who early in the previous decade coined the term "biophilia" 
and first attempted to define it (Wilson, 1984). In his 
essay, Kellert defines biophilia as "a biologically based, 
inherent human need to affiliate with life and lifelike 
processes" and proposes that "the widest valuational 
affiliation with life and lifelike processes (ecological 
functions and structures, for example) has conferred 
distinctive advantages in the human evolutionary struggle to 
adapt, persist, and thrive as individuals and as a species." 
Kellert purports the chapter’s purpose is to "[examine] nine 
fundamental aspects of our species’ presumably biological 
basis for valuing and affiliating with the natural world," 
which Kellert identifies as "utilitarian, naturalistic, 
ecologistic-scientific, aesthetic, symbolic, humanistic, 
moralistic, dominionistic, and negativistic valuations of 
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nature." 
 However, Kellert (1993a) does not present the results 
of any new empirical work as evidence of the existence of 
his "nine hypothesized dimensions of the biophilic 
tendency." Instead, Kellert (1993a) makes reference to more 
than two-dozen prior studies that investigated "attitudes 
toward animals," including Kellert (1976b), Kellert (1979), 
Kellert & Berry (1981), Kellert (1985), Kellert (1993b), and 
Kellert (1993c). Arguing in heavily qualified language that 
the findings from these prior studies point to the existence 
of biophilic values, Kellert (1993a) notes:     
What began as merely the objective of describing 
variation in people’s perceptions of animals gradually 
emerged as the possibility of universal expressions of 
basic human affinities for the natural world . . . [the 
"attitudes toward animals" typology’s] occurrence . . . 
in a wide variety of taxonomic, behavioral, 
demographic, historic, and cultural contexts suggests 
the distinct possibility that these categories might 
very well be reflections of universal and functional 
expressions of our species’ dependence on the natural 
world. 
 Conceptually, the biophilic values described in this 
chapter are similar to their "attitude toward animals" 
namesakes identified in prior Kellert studies. However, in 
Kellert (1993a), the ecologistic and scientistic attitudes 
described in prior studies are consolidated in Kellert 
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(1993a) into one biophilic value entitled "ecologistic-
scientific." According to Kellert (1993a), this change was 
warranted on theoretical grounds because "both perspectives 
similarly reflect the motivational urge for precise study 
and systematic inquiry of the natural world and the related 
belief that nature can be understood through empirical 
study." Another significant difference between the 
"attitudes toward animals" typology that appears in 
Kellert’s previous work and biophilic values typology in 
Kellert (1993a) is the addition of a new construct: 
symbolic. Kellert notes that the symbolic value of nature is 
reflected most clearly in the role that nature has played in 
the development of human language. 
Echoing the claims initially made in Kellert (1993a), 
The Value of Life: Biological Diversity and Human Society 
(Kellert, 1996) affirms the existence of biophilia as a 
"deep biological need for affiliating with life and nature" 
and the nine values identified in Kellert (1993a) as 
"[reflective of] a range of physical, emotional, and 
intellectual expressions of the biophilic tendency to 
associate with nature." However, in what might be described 
as a fairly obvious hedge, Kellert (1996) defines biophilic 
values as "weak biological tendencies . . . requiring 
learning and experience if they are to become stable and 
consistently manifest . . . Learning and experience exert a 
fundamental shaping influence on the content, direction, and 
strength of these values. Without this reinforcement, the 
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values may become vestigial and distorted." However, Kellert 
(1996) is not an attempt at persuading readers that 
biophilia and biophilic values are real phenomena. Their 
existence is assumed. Rather, the central thesis of Kellert 
(1996) is that loss of biodiversity on Earth may represent 
"more . . . than just the diminution of people’s material 
options [and] . . . might also signify the possibility of 
diminished emotional and intellectual well-being and 
capacity."     
Like Kellert (1993a), Kellert (1996) presents the 
results of no new empirical work but instead refers to the 
results of previous studies (e.g., Kellert & Westervelt, 
1983; Kellert, 1985). Additionally, Kellert (1996) claims 
that "The development of this typology of basic values 
facilitated the measurement of the American public’s 
attitudes toward wildlife and its conservation," a statement 
that reads like revisionist history to anyone familiar 
enough with Kellert’s prior work to know that, in describing 
this typology, the term "attitudes" is utilized extensively 
and consistently by Kellert beginning in 1974 and the term 
"values" did not appear in Kellert’s published work until 
1993. 
  Entitled Kinship to Mastery: Biophilia in Human 
Evolution and Development, Kellert (1997) reaffirms the 
claims of Kellert’s prior works by asserting that 
"expressions of biophilia represent, to varying degrees, 
weak biological tendencies that are greatly dependent on 
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learning, experience, and social support for their full and 
functional realization." However, Kellert (1997) adds to the 
conversation about biophilia by providing many examples of 
how biophilia is expressed by humans individually and 
collectively, as well as functionally and dysfunctionally. 
Some examples of how, according to Kellert (1997), the 
Naturalistic value is expressed appear in Table 5. 
 
Table 5 
Expressions of Biophilic Value of Naturalism in Kellert 
(1997)  
 Functional Dysfunctional
Individual " . . . picking berries, 
gathering mushrooms, 
harvesting firewood, 
digging clams, fishing or 
hunting . . . pursuits 
that reflect a passion for 
extracting a portion of 
our sustenance from the 
land and its creatures." 
Harvesting endangered or 
threatened wild species 
Collective Commercial exploitation of 
wild species to produce 
food, medicine, clothing, 
building materials, and so 
on. 
Commercial exploitation 
of wild species to the 
point of extinction or 
ecosystem disruption, 
"spurred by a view of 
species as inexhaustible, 
easily replaced by other 
creatures, or irrelevant 
because of presumed 
future inventions and new 
technology." 
 
 
Kellert (1997) also provides examples of how biophilic 
values are typically denied or suppressed in modern society. 
For example, persons doubting the existence or importance of 
naturalistic values often equate progress with "one’s 
distance from--and control over--the natural world." Kellert 
(1997) writes: 
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The virtues of domesticating nature and transforming 
natural landscapes were presumably proved by our 
victories over hunger, disease, and scarcity. Western 
civilization prided itself on food surpluses and 
material affluence achieved through the mass production 
of cultivated crops and the elimination of wild 
competitors. Modern medicine achieved its ends by 
controlling and eradicating other organisms; industrial 
production and urbanization by subduing and 
transforming natural habitats; contemporary agriculture 
and forestry by creating enormous monocultures through 
homogenizing and simplifying natural landscapes. These 
"triumphs" of modern life required conquering wild 
nature and confirmed a view of progress and 
civilization as synonymous with controlling and 
transforming natural diversity.  
Like Kellert (1993a) and Kellert (1996), Kellert (1997) 
presents the results of no new empirical work but instead 
refers to the results of one previous study (i.e., Kellert, 
1993c). 
Kellert (2002) reiterates ideas expressed in Kellert 
(1996) and Kellert (1997), affirming the existence of "a 
typology of nine basic values of the natural world . . . 
[that are] . . . thought to constitute ‘weak’ biological 
tendencies or genetic inclinations to affiliate with natural 
process and diversity and are collectively labeled 
biophilia." Moreover, like Kellert (1997), Kellert (2002) 
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asserts that "the insufficient and atrophied or the 
exaggerated and inordinate expression of any of these values 
is considered over the long-term dysfunctional and 
maladaptive." However, unlike the aforementioned works, 
Kellert (2002) focuses specifically on the importance of 
biophilia in the personality and character development of 
children. For example, Kellert (2002) claims:  
. . . functional benefits stemming from [the 
naturalistic] value include inclinations for 
exploration, discovery, curiosity, inquisitiveness, and 
imagination, enhanced self-confidence and self-esteem 
by demonstrating competence and adaptability in nature, 
and greater calm and coping capacities through 
heightened temporal awareness and spatial involvement.  
However, Kellert (2002) supports its claims about the 
presence (and ages of emergence) of these biophilic values 
in children by citing the results of cross-sectional surveys 
that measured attitudes toward animals (Kellert & 
Westervelt, 1983; Kellert, 1985) and theoretical work 
(Kellert, 1996). Kellert (2002) presents the results of no 
new empirical work.  
Unlike Kellert (1993), Kellert (1996), Kellert (1997), 
and Kellert (2002), Kellert (2005) reports the results of a 
relatively recent data-collection effort. Specifically, 
Kellert (2005) discusses a research project called the 
"Mastodon Study," in which "information relevant to 
measuring [biophilic] values . . . was obtained through a 
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forty-five minute survey administered to more than two 
thousand residents [of south-central Connecticut], through 
observational data, and through secondary sources." Kellert 
(2005) found a "strong relationship between environmental 
quality, people’s [biophilic] values, and human physical and 
mental well-being in various urban and nonurban 
communities." However, Kellert (2005) did not report the 
magnitude of these relationships nor provide any specific 
information (e.g. the number and wording of survey items, 
the biophilic value or values to which each item was 
intended to correspond, the options available to respondents 
on the survey response scale, and so on) regarding the 
measurement of the biophilic values. Consequently, Kellert 
(2005) did little to improve on past efforts or inform 
future efforts to measure biophilia.  
Strengths and Weaknesses of Kellert’s Work 
Kellert’s typology of attitudes toward animals is 
nothing short of a pioneering effort, a conceptual framework 
that he developed from scratch (Kellert, 1974) and refined 
over three decades, collecting data from thousands of 
participants across multiple demographic groups (age, 
gender, profession, and so on) and nationalities (Kellert, 
1974; Kellert 1976a; Kellert, 1979; Kellert, 1993c; Kellert 
& Berry, 1981; Kellert & Westervelt, 1983; Kellert, 2005).  
Moreover, many of Kellert’s works discuss the distribution 
of these attitudes across demographic groups, providing 
limited convergent and discriminant evidence for the 
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construct validity of his attitude typology.  
Unfortunately, Kellert’s empirical studies suffer from 
some serious methodological deficiencies. For example, none 
of these studies report the extent to which Kellert’s 
instruments are correlated with other measures of similar 
constructs. Moreover, very few of the studies report the use 
of advanced statistical methods (e.g., factor-analytic 
techniques) to investigate the construct validity of the 
attitudinal components in Kellert’s typology. To be sure, 
this limitation is not unexpected since, at the time most of 
this research was conducted (i.e., the 1970s and 1980s), the 
equipment (i.e., computer hardware and software) and 
expertise required to use such methods was much less common 
than today. However, other methological gaps--e.g., missing 
MFDA statistics in Kellert (1974); missing cluster analysis 
statistics in Kellert (1976a); no clusters or correlational 
analysis statistics in Kellert (1979); almost no reporting 
of reliability coefficients; and so on--seem less excusable.      
All of Kellert texts that discuss biophilia (Kellert, 
1993a, 1996, 1997, 2002, 2005) assert that it consists of 
multiple "values" (e.g., naturalism, moralism, humanism, 
scientism, ecologism, negativism, and so on) that have led 
people to affiliate with nature in ways that have enhanced 
homo sapiens’ long-term viability. However, in nearly all 
the Kellert texts that discuss biophilia (Kellert, 1993a, 
1996, 1997, 2002), the empirical evidence utilized to 
demonstrate the existence of biophilic values is actually 
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data collected during prior studies (Kellert, 1974, 1976a, 
1979, 1993c; Kellert & Berry, 1981; Kellert & Westervelt, 
1983) that had a much more limited focus--i.e., the 
measurement of attitudes toward animals only, excluding all 
other organisms that might be considered "wildlife" and all 
other phenomena that might be called "nature." (In fact, 
only Kellert (2005) reports the collection of data 
specifically focused on biophilic values. However, Kellert 
(2005) provides almost no technical information regarding 
how the data were collected or analyzed.) As a result, 
claims that the prior studies substantiate the existence of 
biophilic values are suspect; the instrumentation utilized 
in those studies lacks sufficient content validity to 
support such inferences. 
In conclusion, Kellert’s contribution to the study of 
people’s attitudes toward animals was thoroughly original, 
was undeniably trailblazing, and was (in fact, still is) 
unparalleled in scope. However, the reported results of his 
data analyses were insufficient to support any but the 
weakest of claims regarding the construct validity of his 
typology of attitudes toward animals. Moreover, Kellert 
overreaches when he utilizes the data from his "attitudes 
toward animals" studies as evidence for the content validity 
of his typology of biophilic values.   
Other Scholars Using Kellert’s Typology 
 Kellert’s typology is often cited by scholars and 
researchers in articles on environmental attitudes and 
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biophilia (e.g., Plous, 1993; Ulrich, 1993; Nabhan & St. 
Antoine, 1993; Nabhan, 1994; Kahn, 1999; Gullone, 2000; 
Herzog & Dorr, 2000; Herzog, 2002; Drews, 2003; Myers & 
Saunders, 2002; Knight, et al., 2003; Vollum, 2004; Mayer & 
McPherson-Frantz, 2004; Lopez, et al., 2007; Knight, 2008). 
Moreover, in the past decade, a small number of scholars 
have conducted empirical studies that employed Kellert’s 
typology (Drews, 2002; Thompson & Mintzes, 2002; Rauwald & 
Moore, 2002; Barney et al., 2005; Lukas & Ross, 2005; Prokop 
& Kubiatko, 2008). 
 Drews (2002) utilized a sample of 1021 adults and 177 
children in Costa Rica to collect data for a 27-item, 4-
point, "attitudes toward animals" scale modeled after 
Kellert and Berry (1981) but focusing on fauna found in 
Costa Rica. Utilizing a principal components analysis with 
an orthogonal rotation, Drews (2002) found and retained five 
factors with eigenvalues ranging from 1.21 to 3.76. 
Altogether, the five factors accounted for 39% of the 
indicators’ variance. These factors were labeled 
Inquisitive, Sentimental, Schematic, Materialistic, and 
Ethical, and they corresponded (very roughly) to Kellert’s 
Scientistic, Humanistic, Aesthetic, Utilitarian, and 
Moralistic dimensions. Drews (2002) did not report factor 
loadings for any of the items on his scale, nor did he 
specify the minimum factor loading value utilized for 
assignment of an item to a particular factor. 
 Thompson and Mintzes (2002) adapted Kellert’s typology 
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to assess the attitudes of 120 college students toward 
sharks. A principal components analysis with a varimax 
rotation of Thompson and Mintzes’ five-point, 39-item scale 
revealed four factors with eigenvalues exceeding 2.0. These 
factors were labeled Utilitarian/Negative, Naturalistic, 
Scientific, and Moralistic. Items with factor loadings of 
0.45 or greater were assigned to a factor. 
 Rauwald and Moore (2002) administered a 27-item, 
Kellert-like measure to 758 undergraduates at three 
universities located in three different countries (Trinidad, 
Dominican Republic, and the United States). Principal 
components analysis7 revealed four factors 
(Moralistic/Aesthetic, Dominionistic, Utilitarian, and 
Humanistic) that together accounted for 39% to 45% of the 
variance in the indicators8. Items with factor loadings of 
0.41 or greater were assigned to a factor. For 21 of the 
items, Rauwald and Moore utilized a ten-point response scale 
that ranged from "strongly disagree" to "strongly agree." 
For the other 6 items, Rauwald and Moore employed a ten-
point response scale ranging from "being unimportant to you" 
to "being very important to you personally."    
 Utilizing a convenience sample of 239 participants 
ranging in age from 10 to 25, Barney et al. (2005) developed 
a 39-item, 3-point, Kellert-like measure that focused 
                                                 
7
 Rauwald and Moore (2002) does not specify the type of 
rotation utilized. 
8
 The percentage of variance (POV) range is specified here 
because Rauwald and Moore (2002) reports POV values for each 
country but not an overall POV value. 
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specifically on attitudes toward dolphins. Principal 
components analysis with a varimax rotation revealed three 
factors, labeled Humanistic, Utilitarian, and Ecoscientific. 
Items with factor loadings of 0.52 or greater were assigned 
to a factor. However, Barney et al. (2005) does not report 
the percentage of variance explained by any of the factors, 
eigenvalues for any of the factors, or results from 
examinations of scree plots. 
 The 28-item, six-point (from "strongly agree" to 
"strongly disagree"), Kellert-like scale in Lukas and Ross 
(2005) was administered to 1000 visitors to the ape facility 
at a metropolitan zoo in the United States and focused 
exclusively on attitudes toward gorillas and chimpanzees. A 
factor analysis with a varimax rotation revealed six 
factors, which were labeled Naturalistic, Ecoscientistic, 
Moralistic, Negativistic, Utilitarian, and Dominionistic. 
Items with factor loadings of 0.53 or greater were assigned 
to a factor. However, Lukas and Ross (2005) does not report 
the percentage of variance explained by any of the factors, 
eigenvalues for any of the factors, or results from 
examinations of scree plots.    
Utilizing a sample of 462 participants in Slovokia, 
Prokop and Kubiatko (2008) developed a 30-item, five-point 
(from "Strongly Disagree" to "Strongly Agree"), Kellert-like 
scale that focused on children’s attitudes toward predators 
and prey (specifically, wolves and rabbits). A factor 
analysis with an orthogonal rotation revealed three factors, 
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labeled Scientific, Ecologistic, and Myths about parental 
care. These three factors had eigenvalues of 4.28, 1.7, and 
1.3, respectively. Items with factor loadings of 0.38 or 
greater were assigned to a factor. However, Prokop and 
Kubiatko do not report the percentage of variance for which 
any of the factors account. 
 The six aforementioned studies (Thompson & Mintzes, 
2002; Rauwald & Moore, 2002; Drews, 2002; Lucas & Ross, 
2005; Barney et al., 2005; and Prokop & Kubiatko, 2008) 
represent a new stage in the development of Kellert-typology 
measures in several ways. First, these "neo-Kellert" studies 
exhibit a higher level of methodological sophistication than 
most of Kellert’s own work. As noted repeatedly in earlier 
sections of this chapter, Kellert’s publications often did 
not report the values of key statistical tests (e.g., 
reliability coefficients) typically utilized in instrument-
development-and-validation studies. Moreover, Kellert rarely 
utilized factor-analytic tests or any other established 
techniques for evaluating the dimensionality of his 
measures. In contrast, as shown in Table 6, the use of 
advanced statistical methods and reporting of technical 
information and test values was fairly common (although not 
consistent or universal) in the neo-Kellert studies. 
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Table 6 
Neo-Kellert Studies Published Since 2000  
 Utilized 
Factor-
Analytic 
Tech-
niques 
Reported 
Eigen-
values  
Reported 
POV  
Reported 
Minimum 
Factor 
Loadings 
Reported 
Cron-
bach’s 
Alpha  
Repor-
ted Item 
Wording 
Thompson &
Mintzes 
(2002) 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Rauwald 
& Moore 
(2002) 
Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Drews 
(2002) 
Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Lukas & 
Ross 
(2005) 
Yes No No Yes No Yes 
Barney 
et al. 
(2005) 
Yes No No Yes No Yes 
Prokop & 
Kubiatko 
(2008) 
Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
 
 
Kellert frequently claimed that peoples’ attitudes toward 
animals (and later biophilic values toward nature) were 
multidimensional. However, in most of Kellert’s published 
studies, the results of statistical tests that would support 
such assertions about dimensionality went unreported or 
underreported. For example, as previously mentioned, the 
description of the multiple discriminant function analysis 
(MFDA) procedure that led Kellert to devise his typology of 
attitudes toward animals (Kellert, 1974) failed to report 
several key values that most researchers consider critical 
for determining the results of that type of statistical 
test. Similarly, Kellert (1976a), Kellert (1976b), Kellert 
(1978), Kellert (1979), Kellert and Berry (1980), Kellert 
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(1993b), and Kellert (1993c) report that the results of 
advanced statistical procedures (specifically, MFDA and/or 
cluster analysis) supported the dimensionality of Kellert’s 
typology. However, none of these publications provide 
technical information about these results. Thus, the studies 
summarized in Table 6 represent the first technically 
sophisticated and reasonably transparent attempts to examine 
the dimensionality of Kellert’s typology.  
Another way that the neo-Kellert studies are a 
significant departure from Kellert’s work is that most of 
the former are narrower in focus. Whereas most of Kellert’s 
empirical work examined the attitudes toward animals in 
general9, nearly all the neo-Kellert studies target regional 
(e.g., Costa Rica) fauna or specific species (e.g., sharks, 
dolphins, gorilla and chimpanzees). However, the term 
"biophilia" does not appear in any of the neo-Kellert 
studies, even those that cite Kellert (1996). In fact, just 
one of the neo-Kellert studies (i.e., Rauwald & Moore, 2002) 
makes an indirect and superficial reference to the notion of 
biophilia, noting "Kellert believed that his measures of 
attitudes, knowledge, and behaviors toward animals are a 
                                                 
9
 Kellert (1993c) and Kellert (1999) are exceptions. Kellert 
(1993c) attempted to measure attitudes toward invertebrates. 
Kellert (1999) included 94 “attitude” questions and focused 
exclusively on marine mammals. However, Kellert (1999) 
proposed no typology of attitudes. Additionally, Kellert 
(1999) states, “Scales were also developed to allow 
comparisons of broad views of marine mammals and their 
management among varying groups. Factor analysis techniques 
were used to cluster questions for scaling purposes.” 
However, Kellert (1999) provides no results or statistics 
from the aforementioned factor analytic tests.    
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reflection of the relationship between humans and nature." 
Consequently, it is reasonable to believe that the authors 
of the neo-Kellert studies were not champions of the 
biophilia hypothesis. 
 One interesting finding that appears across all the 
neo-Kellert studies is that the dimensionality of Kellert’s 
typology is never confirmed. None of the neo-Kellert studies 
revealed more than six factors, whereas Kellert’s original 
typology consisted of no less than seven (cf., Kellert, 
1974) and up to ten (cf., Kellert, 1978) attitude types, 
with most Kellert studies finding eight attitude types (cf., 
Kellert, 1979; Kellert & Berry, 1980; Kellert & Westervelt, 
1983; Kellert, 1985; Kellert, 2005). However, it is 
difficult to draw firm conclusions from this observed lack 
of confirmation, as the neo-Kellert studies are few in 
number, utilize samples from very different populations, 
focus on different fauna, and vary in terms of 
methodological quality. For example, Rauwald and Moore 
(2002) utilizes one response scale for 21 (88%) of their 
instrument’s items and another response scale for six (22%) 
of its items. Interestingly, all six of the items that 
loaded on the Moralistic/Aesthetic factor utilized the 
latter response, while the 21 items that loaded on the other 
three factors utilized the former scale. Consequently, it is 
not hard to assert that the Moralistic/Aesthetic factor 
found in Rauwald and Moore is not at least partially a 
methodological artifact. 
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Related Constructs 
     Interest in environmental preservation is a construct 
related to biophilia and has been characterized as having 
two facets: ecocentrism and anthropocentrism (Gagnon-
Thompson & Barton). Persons with an ecocentric (or 
biospheric, in the language of Schultz et. al., 2001, 2004, 
2005) interest in environmental preservation believe that 
nature has inherent, self-evident value. All species and 
their habitats deserve protection, even when providing this 
protection is disadvantageous or inconvenient to humans. 
Ecocentric persons would agree with Nash’s (1991) assertion 
that “nonhuman organisms—animals and plants—are more than a 
means to others’ ends; they are ends for themselves.” 
Consequently, a person exhibiting high levels of ecocentrism 
would be very supportive of efforts to protect the Devil's 
Hole pupfish, a species of inch-long fish that live in only 
one place (an underground cavern in Pahrump, Nevada) and 
whose population consists of just several hundred 
individuals. To an ecocentric person, it would not matter if 
pupfish met all or none of the standards of value that 
humans often place on other species. The mere fact that the 
pupfish is alive makes it worthy of some reasonable amount 
of protection.  
In contrast, persons whose interest in preserving the 
environment is anthropocentric (i.e., persons who value 
nature only to the extent to which it enhances human quality 
of life) would likely see efforts to protect the pupfish as 
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a waste of time and effort unless a strong argument could be 
made that extinction of the pupfish would be an cataclysmic 
event that would reverberate through the rest of the 
ecosystem and negatively affect humans. To the 
anthropocentric person, nature is a frenemy that deserves 
protection, but only in those cases when nature’s interests 
align with those of humanity. Likewise, nature merits little 
or no consideration when its preservation threatens to 
impede human activity. For example, an anthropocentric 
preservationist might strongly endorse measures safeguarding 
a river that supplies local drinking water but energetically 
oppose efforts to protect an adjacent wetland upon which a 
multinational corporation wishes to build a factory that 
might eventually employ hundreds of local residents. 
     Anthropocentric interest in environmental preservation 
can be further subdivided into two sub-facets: egoism and 
altruism (Schultz, et. al., 2001, 2004, 2005). Persons with 
an egoistic interest in the environment are most concerned 
about environmental protection when their own personal 
interests are at stake. For example, a egoistic Las Vegas, 
Nevada, resident may be very worried about the environmental 
impact of storing high-level nuclear waste in dry casks at 
Yucca Mountain, which is just 90 miles north of the city, 
but not remotely concerned about the hazards associated with 
storing that waste in West Virginia or continuing to store 
it at the power plants where it is produced. (Egoistic 
persons are well-represented in every NIMBY protest 
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movement.) Persons with an altruistic interest in the 
environment take the concerns of other persons into account 
when considering environmental issues, especially when they 
know or feel connected in some way to those other persons. 
Nevertheless, even the altruistic still place human 
interests above those of the natural world. For example, 
while an altruistic person might decry air pollution no 
matter where it occurs because it causes respiratory 
problems in humans but be relatively unconcerned about the 
effect of light pollution on the survival of inconspicuous 
nocturnal species.   
     The opposite of environmental preservation interest is 
environmental apathy (Gagnon-Thompson & Barton). The 
apathetic are strongly indifferent to the natural world and 
deeply skeptical of all claims that human activity creates 
ecological problems that require attention and remediation. 
Among this group are persons who declare as proof of global 
warming's non-existence every small piece of meteorological 
information that does not neatly fit into their 
understanding of human-induced climate change theory.     
 It is important to note that few people would serve as 
perfect representations of any of the above constructs. 
Rather, on some environmental issues, a given person may be 
very ecocentric while on others, more anthropocentric (or 
even apathetic). Thus, it would probably be more accurate to 
say that these constructs represent end points on a 
multidimensional continuum of environmental concern, with 
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individuals best characterized according to their proximity 
to or distance from each of these endpoints across a variety 
of environmental issues. 
 The degree to which a person feels interest (ecocentric 
or anthropocentric) or apathy toward the environment and its 
preservation may be a function of the extent to which he or 
she subscribes to the New Ecological Paradigm (Dunlap et. 
al., 2000; Dunlap, 2008). In the 1970s, Dunlap identified 
what he called the New Ecological Paradigm (NEP) and noted 
that it challenged what other scholars (i.e., Pirages and 
Ehrlich) described as the dominant social paradigm (DSP) of 
American culture at that time. This DSP included, “a 
commitment to individualism and laissez-faire government . . 
. [as well as] beliefs in progress, material abundance and 
the goodness of growth; faith in the efficacy of science and 
technology; and a view of nature as something to be subdued” 
(Dunlap, 2008). The NEP, in contrast, focuses on the perils 
of unregulated growth in human societies, the fragility of 
natural ecosystems, and rejection of the view that nature 
exist solely for human consumption. Consequently, an NEP 
subscriber would likely be ecocentric in terms of his or her 
interest in environmental preservation. On the other hand, a 
person whose attitudes are shaped primarily by the 
aforementioned DSP would more than likely be anthropocentric 
or even apathetic regarding environmental preservation.     
 Mayer and McPherson Frantz (2004) define the construct 
nature connectedness as the extent to people “view 
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themselves as egalitarian members of the broader natural 
community; feel a sense of kinship with it; view themselves 
as belonging to the natural world as much as it belongs to 
them ...” Consequently, nature connectedness is like 
ecocentrism but much more intense, emphasizing not only 
equivalence between the needs of humans and non-humans but 
also a strong emotional link between humans and other 
species. Nature-relatedness, on the other hand, focuses on a 
deep understanding and appreciation for all aspects of the 
natural world, even those that humans often find revolting 
(Nisbet, 2008).   
 Instruments associated with each of these related 
constructs are described in Chapter 3 of this dissertation 
and are utilized as part of this effort to validate the BAI. 
The expected relationships between these related con-structs 
and the BAI dimensions are noted in Tables 7 and 8. 
Practical Implications of this Literature Review 
 Over the course of this literature review, it has been 
established that: 
1) While many scholars have identified specific 
phenomena that they claim are evidence of the 
existence of biophilia, only Stephen Kellert has 
attempted to create instrumentation to measure this 
construct. The scope of Kellert’s work is vast in 
terms of the size and range of the populations from 
which he collected data, the number of occasions 
during which he collected data, and the number of 
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years over which he collected data. 
2) Kellert’s instrumentation does not completely 
address the construct that he claims it measures. 
Specifically, the items on Kellert’s instruments 
focus on animals and omit other life forms and 
natural phenomena. The work of other researchers who 
have developed Kellert-like scales (Thompson & 
Mintzes, 2002; Rauwald & Moore, 2002; Drews, 2002; 
Lukas & Ross, 2005; Barney et al., 2005; Prokop & 
Kubiatko, 2008) suffers from the same limitation. 
3) In the literature, there is insufficient information 
about the data-analytic procedures that Kellert uti-
lized in establishing his typology. Thus, his claims 
regarding the typology’s dimensionality are suspect.  
4) Studies conducted by other researchers attempting to 
develop Kellert-like scales (Thompson & Mintzes, 
2002; Rauwald & Moore, 2002; Drews, 2002; Lukas & 
Ross, 2005; Barney et al., 2005; Prokop & Kubiatko, 
2008) have been more technically sophisticated and 
informative than Kellert’s work. The results of 
these studies have not supported the dimensionality 
of Kellert’s typology as proposed by Kellert 
himself. However, due to the relatively small number 
of these studies, it is probably premature to  
abandon efforts to find empirical support for the 
Kellert typology.   
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Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this study is to: 
1) Develop a Kellert-like instrument that fully 
represents the construct biophilia (i.e., focuses 
not just on animals but also on plant life and other 
natural phenomena). This instrument will be called 
the Biophilic Attitudes Inventory (BAI). 
2) Utilize appropriate data-analytic procedures to 
investigate the BAI’s dimensionality. 
3) Collect convergent and discriminant evidence for the 
BAI’s validity by examining the extent to which the 
BAI correlates with well-established measures of 
environmental attitudes. 
Research Questions 
 The research questions addressed in this study are: 
1) Can a reliable, stable, and valid measure of 
biophilic attitudes be developed? 
2) If so, what would be the dimensionality of this 
measure (i.e., the BAI)? 
3) Will the instrument’s (i.e, the BAI’s) dimensiona-
lity confirm or fail to confirm Kellert’s typology? 
4) If Kellert’s typology is not confirmed, how might 
biophilia be reconceptualized based on the results 
of the data analysis conducted in this study? 
5) Does the instrument and/or its respective subscales 
correlate in expected ways with other well-
established measures of environmental attitudes? 
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Hypotheses 
I will compare two hypotheses which I refer to as the 
full-model and reduced-model hypothesis.  The former 
hypothesis states that biophilia, as measured by the BAI, 
includes seven dimensions.  The latter hypothesis states 
that biophilia has two dimensions. 
The full-model hypothesis in this study is: 
1) Biophilia, as measured by the BAI, has seven 
dimensions: 
a) Dominionism (DOM), i.e., nature is meant to 
challenge humans and be mastered by humans;  
b) Ecologism/Scientism (E/S), i.e., nature is an 
intriguing system of interdependence among 
species and natural habitats, as well as a 
fascinating object of study; 
c) Humanism (HUM), i.e., nature provides humans 
with opportunities to fulfill emotional needs 
for bonding, intimacy, and companionship; 
d) Moralism (MO), i.e., the natural world and its 
non-human inhabitants have moral standing and 
thus should not be exploited or abused;  
e) Naturalism (NAT),i.e., direct contact with 
nature, especially in unadulterated milieus, 
provides humans with emotional satisfaction;  
f) Negativism (NEG), i.e., nature is uncomfortable, 
disgusting, and/or dangerous; and 
g) Utilitarianism (UTI), i.e., nature is merely or 
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primarily a resource for humans to utilize.  
2) If the seven-dimension structure of BAI is con-
firmed, the BAI subscales will correlate signifi-
cantly with other measures of environmental atti-
tudes, which are described in Chapter 3, in the 
directions described in Table 7. 
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Table 7 
Predicted Correlations under Full-Model Hypothesis 
between BAI Subscales and Other Measures  
Scale-Subscale BAIDOM 
BAI
E/S 
BAI
HUM 
BAI 
MOR 
BAI 
NAT 
BAI 
NEG 
BAI
UTI 
EAEAS10-Ecocentric - +  + +  - 
EAEAS-Anthropocentric +   -   + 
EAEAS-Apathy  - -   +  
EMS11-Biospheric - + + + + -  
EMS-Altruistic +  +    + 
EMS-Egoistic  -  -  +  
RNEPS12 - +  +  - - 
CNS13 - + +  + - - 
NRS14-Self  + + +  -  
NRS-Perspective - +  +  - - 
NRS-Experience     + -  
SRAN-Part 1  + +  + -  
SRAN-Part 2  + +  + -  
 
 
The reduced-model hypothesis in this study is: 
1) Biophilia, as measured by the BAI, has two 
dimensions: 
a) Biophilia, i.e., nature is beneficial to the 
intellectual and emotional development of humans 
and deserves to be held in high regard.  
b) Biophobia, i.e., nature is frequently a 
nuisance, obstacle, or threat to humans, having 
                                                 
10
 Ecocentric/Anthropocentric/Environmental Apathy Scale 
(EAEAS) 
11
 Environmental Motives Scale (EMS) 
12
 New Ecological Paradigm Scale (RNEPS) 
13
 Connectedness to Nature Scale (CNS) 
14
 Nature Relatedness Scale (NRS) 
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value only to the extent it can be controlled 
and thus exploited.  
In this scenario, BAI items previously associated 
with Ecologism, Humanism, Moralism, Naturalism, and 
Scientism will load on Biophilia. BAI items 
previously associated with Dominionism, Negativism, 
and Utilitarianism will load on Biophobia.  
2) In the two-dimension structure (i.e., Biophilia and 
Biophobia), the Biophilia and Biophobia subscales 
will correlate significantly with other measures of 
environmental attitudes in the directions described 
in Table 8. 
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Table 8 
Predicted Correlations under Reduced-Model Hypothesis 
between BAI Subscales and Other Measures  
Scale-Subscale BAIBiophilia 
BAI 
Biophobia 
EAEAS-Ecocentric + - 
EAEAS-Anthropocentric   
EAEAS-Apathy - + 
EMS-Biospheric + - 
EMS-Altruistic   
EMS-Egoistic - + 
RNEPS + - 
CNS + - 
NRS-Self + - 
NRS-Perspective + - 
NRS-Experience + - 
SRAN-Part 1 + - 
SRAN-Part 2 + - 
 
 
This study will test the hypothesis that biophilia, as 
measured by the BAI, is seven-dimensional construct because 
historically Kellert and his disciples have always dis-
cussed biophilia in terms of seven or more categories of 
attitudes or values. Consequently, it is necessary and ap-
propriate, when attempting to validate any Kellert-inspired 
instrument, to test the goodness of fit between the: 
 Predicted item interrelationships in a seven-factor 
model based on Kellert; and 
 Actual observed item interrelationships that emerge from 
data collected using the instrument.     
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However, this study will also test the hypothesis that 
biophilia, as measured by the BAI, is a two-dimensional 
construct because a smaller number of factors is likely to 
produce a more parsimonious (and perhaps more interpretable) 
model. For purposes of testing the reduced-model hypothesis, 
the items associated with Humanism, Ecologism/Scientism, 
Moralism, Naturalism will be considered indicators of 
biophilia and the indicators associated with Negativism, 
Utilitarianism, and Dominionism will be considered 
indicators of biophobia. This regrouping of indicators makes 
sense since, as previously noted, Orr (1993) described 
biophobia as a tendency among civilized humans to view the 
natural world without empathy, to consider the presence of 
other life forms solely in terms how they advanced or 
impeded human interests and/or how they submitted to or 
resisted human control.  
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CHAPTER 3 
 
METHODOLOGY AND DATA DESCRIPTION 
 
Participants 
The participants in this study (n=334)15 were Fall 2010 
students from the UNLV Department of Educational Psycho-
logy’s research-subject pool. Ninety-five participants 
(28.4%) were male; 239 (71.6%), female. The participants 
ranged in age from 18 to 53, with a mean age of 25.6 and a 
standard deviation of 6.7.  
In terms of ethnicity, 239 participants (71.6%) were 
white; 22 (6.6%), African American; 22 (6.6%), Asian; 5 
(1.5%), American Indian or Alaskan Native; 8 (2.5%), Native 
Hawaiian or Pacific Islander; and 16 (4.8%), multi-racial. 
Twenty-two participants (6.6%) did not disclose their 
ethnicities. Sixty participants (18%) were Hispanic or 
Latino; 271 (81.1%) were not Hispanic or Latino. Three 
participants (0.9%) provided no response to the 
Hispanic/Latino status question.   
Materials 
The principal instrument in this study was the author’s 
Biophilic Attitudes Inventory (BAI). Other materials, 
                                                 
15
 Confirmatory factor-analytic procedures generally require 
a subject-to-observed-indicator ratio of no less than 3:1 
(Kline, 2005). Consequently, to utilize such procedures to 
examine the factor structure of the BAI will require at 
least 144 subjects or participants. 
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utilized for investigating the BAI’s convergent and 
discriminant validity, included: 
 Gagnon-Thompson and Barton’s (1994) Ecocentric/ 
Anthropocentric/Environmental Apathy Scale (EAEAS);  
 Schultz’s (2000) Environmental Motives Scale (EMS);  
 Dunlap, Van Liere, Mertig, and Jones’ (2000) Revised 
New Ecological Paradigm Scale (RNEPS);  
 Mayer and McPherson-Frantz’s (2004) Connectedness to 
Nature Scale (CNS);  
 Nisbet, Zelenski, and Murphy’s (2008) Nature 
Relatedness Scale (NRS); and 
 Survey of Recreational Activities in Nature (SRAN) 
BAI is a 48-item scale that I predict will assess the 
extent to which the respondent exhibits biophilic attitudes 
in seven dimensions: Dominionism, Ecologism/Scientism, 
Humanism, Moralism, Naturalism, Negativism, and Utili-
tarianism. To complete the BAI, respondents will utilize a 
five-point Likert-type scale--with response options ranging 
from "(1) Strongly disagree" to "(5) Strongly agree"--to 
signal their level of agreement with declarative statements 
such as "I like the sound of rivers, streams, and washes." I 
developed the BAI items after carefully examining all the 
published attitudinal items that Kellert and his disciples 
utilized--including 24 items from Kellert (1974); 67 items 
from the “National Study Questionnaire” in Kellert (1976a); 
152 items from the “Pilot Study Questionnaire” in Kellert 
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(1976a); 57 items from Kellert (1999); 27 items from Drews 
(2002); 39 items from Thompson and Mintzes (2002); 60 items 
from Barney, et. al. (2005); 28 items from Lukas and Ross 
(2005); and 30 items from Prokop and Kubiatko (2008). As 
shown in Table A.1, almost none of the BAI items are 
verbatim from the work of Kellert or any other scholar, as 
the focus, format, and specific wording of published item 
stems and response categories vary considerably from one 
study to another. Consequently, I utilized the items created 
by Kellert and others mostly as a content mine, extracting 
from them ideas useful in the development of a uniform set 
of BAI items.  
After constructing an initial set of BAI items, I 
collected feedback from several persons16 knowledgeable about 
environmental attitudes and education, soliciting their 
comments regarding both the clarity of the BAI items and the 
extent to which the items were effective indicators of the 
biophilic attitudes with which I associated them. I repeated 
this process after several revisions of the BAI items. The 
purpose of seeking such feedback was to increase the 
likelihood that the final instrument would exhibit clarity 
and conciseness and would not suffer from construct 
underrepresentation (AERA, APA, & NCME, 1999; Furr & 
Bacharach, 2008).  Taking the feedback of these 
                                                 
16
 Daphne Sewing, Project Manager, Forever Earth/Outdoor 
World, UNLV Public Lands Institute; Michele Weibel, Graduate 
Assistant, UNLV Public Lands Institute; Dr. Gregg Schraw, 
Program Evaluator, UNLV Public Lands Institute 
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knowledgeable persons into account, I eliminated numerous 
potential items and arrived at the set that appears in 
Figure A.1 and Table A.1.  
EAEAS (Gagnon-Thompson & Barton, 1994) is a 33-item 
scale that assesses the extent to which the respondent 
exhibits ecocentric attitudes toward nature (i.e., 
"appreciating nature for its own sake, positive affect and 
stress reduction associated with nature, and seeing 
connectedness between humans and animals"), anthropocentric 
attitudes toward nature (i.e., "valuing nature because of 
the material or physical benefits it can provide to 
humans"), and apathy toward nature (i.e., "lack of interest 
in environmental issues, and a general belief that problems 
in this area have been exaggerated."). To complete the 
EAEAS, respondents utilize a five-point Likert-type scale--
with response options ranging from "(1) Strongly disagree" 
to "(5) Strongly agree" to signal their level of agreement 
with declarative statements such as "I prefer wildlife 
preserves to zoos."  
No published studies have reported the results of 
factor-analytic procedures performed with data collected 
using the EAEAS. However, low correlations (i.e., from 0.03 
to 0.19 in magnitude) between the Ecocentric and 
Anthropocentric subscales, low-to-modest correlations (i.e., 
0.18 to 0.37 in magnitude) between the Anthropocentric and 
Apathy subscales, and large-but-inverse correlations (i.e., 
-0.48 to -0.61) between the Ecocentric and Apathy subscales 
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(Gagnon-Thompson & Barton, 1994; Casey & Scott, 2006) 
suggest that the EAEAS may exhibit a three-factor structure. 
Reported reliabilities17 for the EAEAS’ Ecocentric and 
Anthropocentric subscales have ranged between 0.73 and 0.81 
and between 0.67 and 0.74, respectively (Gagnon-Thompson & 
Barton, 1994; Schultz & Zelezny, 1999; Casey & Scott, 2006). 
Reported reliabilities for the Apathy subscale are 0.82 
(Gagnon-Thompson & Barton, 1994; Casey & Scott, 2006).  
EMS (Schultz, 2000) is a 12-item scale that measures 
the extent to which a respondent’s concern for the 
environment is egoistic (i.e., motivated by self interest), 
altruistic (i.e., motivated by concern for other people), 
and/or biospheric (i.e., motivated by concern for other 
living things). Each EMS item begins with the words "I am 
concerned about environmental problems because of the 
consequences for ..." and is completed by one of the 
following 12 words or phrases: animals, plants, marine life, 
birds, me, my future, my lifestyle, my health, all people, 
children, people in my community, and my children. To 
complete each EMS item, respondents utilize a seven-point 
Likert-type scale, with response options ranging from "(1) 
Not important" to "(7) Supreme importance."   
 
                                                 
17
 The conventional wisdom among researchers is that a 
minimum reliability coefficient of 0.7 is acceptable and 0.8 
or above is desirable for purposes of scale or subscale 
development (Bernardi, 1994). However, as Knapp and Brown 
(1995) note, there is no definitive rule or undisputed 
standard regarding minimum reliability coefficients.  
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Utilizing factor-analytic procedures, Schultz (2000), 
Schultz (2001), and Schultz, et al. (2004) found three EMS 
factors: Egoistic, Altruistic, and Biospheric. In Schultz 
(2000), a principal-components analysis revealed these three 
factors accounted for 74% of the variance in the EMS 
indicators. Likewise, in Schultz, et al. (2004), principal 
axis analyses on data collected from two separate samples 
revealed the three factors explained between 66% and 68% of 
the variance in EMS indicators. In Schultz (2000), Schultz 
(2001), and Schultz, et al. (2005), confirmatory factor 
analyses testing one-factor, two-factor, and three-factor 
models, best fit was exhibited by the three-factor models.  
Reported reliabilities for the EMS’ Egoistic, 
Altruistic, and Biospheric subscales have ranged between 
0.60 and 0.93, 0.61 and 0.91, and 0.73 and 0.95, respect-
tively (Schultz, 2000; Schultz, 2001; Schultz, et al., 2004; 
Mayer & McPherson-Frantz, 2004; Schultz, et al., 2005).  
RNEPS (Dunlap, et al., 2000) is a 15-item scale that 
measures respondents’ "‘primitive beliefs’ about the nature 
of the earth and humanity’s relationship with it." 
Specifically, RNEPS items focus on beliefs in five areas: 
humanity’s ability to upset nature’s balance, the existence 
of limits to growth for human societies, humanity’s right to 
dominate nature, humanity’s unique exemption from the 
constraints of nature, and the probability of an ecological 
crisis. To complete the RNEPS, respondents utilize a five-
point, Likert-type scale--with response options ranging from 
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"Strongly agree" to "Strongly disagree" to signal their 
level of agreement with declarative statements such as "The 
balance of nature is strong enough to cope with the impacts 
of modern industrial nations."  
Five published studies have investigated RNEPS’ dimen-
sionnality by utilizing factor-analytic techniques. Four of 
those studies (Dunlap, et al., 2000; Hunter & Rinner, 2003; 
Rideout, et al., 2005; Willis & DeKay, 2007) found only one 
major RNEPS factor. However, in Zografos and Allcroft 
(2007), a principal components analysis revealed a four-
factor structure that replicated two of Dunlap’s "belief" 
areas (specifically, the three RNEPS items addressing 
"humanity’s right to dominate nature" and the three items 
addressing "existence of limits to growth for human 
societies.") The other two factors that Zografos and 
Allcroft (2007) found subsume the remaining RNEPS items. 
Still, because the majority of studies have not found RNEPS 
to have more than one factor, RNEPS is treated as one-
dimensional for purposes of this dissertation. Reliability 
coefficients for the RNEPS appear in Table 9. 
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Table 9 
Reported Reliability Coefficients for the Revised New 
Ecological Paradigm Scale (RNEPS)  
Study Reliability
Dunlap, et al. (2000)  0.83 
Cordano, et al. (2003) 0.79 
Hunter & Rinner (2003) 0.87 
Mayer & McPherson-Frantz (2004) 0.72 to 0.79 
Schultz, et al. (2004) 0.78 to 0.94 
Rideout, et al. (2005) 0.82 to 0.83 
Schultz, et al. (2005)18 0.56 to 0.74 
Casey & Scott (2006) 0.84 
Willis & DeKay (2007) 0.89 
Nisbet, et al. (2008) 0.75 
   
 
CNS (Mayer & McPherson-Frantz, 2004) is a 14-item scale 
that measures ". . . an individual’s affective, experiential 
connection to nature."  The CNS is based conceptually on the 
work of naturalist Aldo Leopold, who contended that 
motivation to address environmental issues depends on how 
much: 
 . . . people experientially view themselves as 
egalitarian members of the broader natural community; 
feel a sense of kinship with it; view themselves as 
belonging to the natural world as much as it belongs to 
them; and view their welfare as related to the welfare 
of the natural world. (Mayer & McPherson-Frantz, 2004) 
                                                 
18
 Schultz, et al. (2005) collected data from samples 
representing six different countries (Brazil, Czech 
Republic, Germany, India, New Zealand, and Russia), 
utilizing translated versions of the RNEP. The lower 
reliability coefficients (i.e., < 0.7) produced by some of 
these samples were consistent with earlier RNEP studies 
which “yielded low reliabilities for translated versions.” 
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To complete the CNS, respondents utilize a five-point, 
Likert-type scale--with response options ranging from 
"Strongly disagree" to "Strongly agree" to signal their 
level of agreement with declarative statements such as "Like 
a tree can be part of a forest, I feel embedded within the 
broader natural world." 
Utilizing factor-analytic techniques to examine data 
collected from five different samples on five different oc-
casions, Mayer and McPherson-Frantz (2004) found the CNS to 
be a one-dimensional instrument. Reported reliabilities for 
the CNS have ranged from 0.79 to 0.91 (Mayer & McPherson-
Frantz, 2004; Frantz, et al., 2005; Mayer, et al., 2008).  
NRS (Nisbet, et al., 2008) is a 21-item scale that 
measures, like CNS, measures an individual "level of 
connectedness to the natural world." However, according to 
NRS’ developers, the NRS differs from the CNS in that the 
latter "misses the physical aspect of human-nature 
relationships, a key element of individual sense of 
connectedness." To complete the NRS, respondents utilize a 
five-point, Likert-type scale--with response options ranging 
from "Strongly disagree" to "Strongly agree" to signal their 
level of agreement with declarative statements such as "Even 
in the middle of the city, I notice nature around me." 
An exploratory factor analysis of NRS data revealed 
three factors that Nisbet et al. (2008) labeled Self, 
Perspective, and Experience. According the Nisbet et al. 
(2008), the Self factor represents "an internalized 
 74 
identification with nature, reflecting feelings and thoughts 
about one’s personal connection to nature"; the Perspective 
factor, an "external, nature-related worldview, a sense of 
agency concerning individual human actions and their impact 
on all living things"; and Experience, "a physical 
familiarity with the natural world, the level of comfort 
with and desire to be out in nature." 
Reported reliabilities for the NRS have ranged from 
0.85 to 0.87 (Nisbet & Zelenski, 2004; Nisbet, et al., 2008) 
and between 0.81 and 0.84, 0.65 and 0.66, and 0.80 and 0.85 
for the Self, Perspective, and Experience subscales, 
respectively (Nisbet, et., al., 2008). 
Table 10 provides a brief summary of information about 
the EAEAS, EMS, RNEPS, CNS, and NRS. 
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Table 10 
Summary of Information About Established Measures Utilized 
to Examine BAI’s Convergent and Discriminant Validity  
Measure No. of 
Dimen-
sions 
Construct(s) 
Measured 
Relia-
bility 
Predicted Relationships to 
the BAI19 Under 
    
Full-model  Reduced
model  
EAEAS 3 1)Ecocentrism 
 
 
 
2)Anthropo-
centrism; 
 
3)Environmental 
Apathy 
0.73-
0.81 
 
 
0.67-
0.74 
 
0.82 
+E/S, +MOR, 
+NAT, -DOM, 
-UTI 
 
+DOM, +UTI 
-MOR 
 
+NEG, -E/S 
-HUM 
+PHI 
-PHO 
 
 
+PHO 
-PHI 
 
+PHO 
-PH 
EMS 3 1)Egoism 
 
 
2)Altruism 
 
 
3)Biospherism 
 
0.60-
0.93 
 
0.61-
0.91 
 
0.73-
0.95 
 
+NEG, -E/S 
-MOR 
 
+DOM, +HUM 
+UTI 
 
+E/S, +HUM, 
+MOR, +NAT, 
-DOM, -NEG 
+PHO 
-PHI 
 
 
 
 
+PHI 
-PHO 
RNEPS 1 "Primitive" 
Ecological 
Beliefs 
0.56-
0.94 
+E/S, +MOR, 
-DOM, -NEG, 
-UTI 
+PHI 
-PHO 
CNS 1 Affective 
connection to 
nature 
0.79-
0.91 
+E/S 
+HUM 
+NAT 
+PHI 
-PHO 
NRS 3 1)Self 
 
 
2)Perspective 
 
 
 
3)Experience 
 
0.81-
0.84 
 
0.65-
0.66 
 
 
0.80-
0.85 
+E/S, +HUM, 
+MOR, -NEG 
 
+E/S, +MOR, 
-DOM, -NEG, 
-UTI 
 
+NAT 
-NEG 
+PHI 
-PHO 
 
+PHI 
-PHO 
 
 
+PHI 
-PHO 
 
Part 1 of the 22-item Survey of Recreational Activities 
in Nature (SRAN) asks respondents to report how many times 
in the past 12 months they participated in eleven common, 
                                                 
19Under the full-model hypothesis, BAI subscales include 
Dominionism (DOM), Ecologism/Scientism (E/S), Humanism 
(HUM), Moralism (MOR), Naturalism (NAT), Negativism (NEG), 
and Utilitarianism (UTI). Under the reduced-model 
hypothesis, BAI subscales include Biophilia (PHI) and 
Biophobia (PHO).  
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nature-related, leisure-time activities. Part 2 of the SRAN 
asks respondents to report how many times per year (on 
average) that they between ages 6 and 18 participated in the 
same activities specified in Part 1. It is predicted that, 
under the full-model hypothesis, both parts of the SRAN will 
be positively related to BAI E/S, BAI HUM, and BAI NAT. It 
is predicted that, under the re-duced-model hypothesis, both 
parts of the SRAN will be positively related to BAI PHI and 
negatively related to BAI PHO. 
The Appendix section of this dissertation includes the 
instructions, items, and response options associated with 
each of the aforementioned instruments. Furthermore, the 
Appendix specifies the coding (i.e., standard or reverse) 
for each instrument item. Finally, the Appendix notes the 
subscale (where applicable) to which each instrument item 
belongs. 
Procedure 
All participants completed all instruments online using 
Survey Monkey between September and December 2010. 
Presentation of instruments was in the same order with the 
BAI presented first to eliminate possible response confounds 
with other instruments. Along with responses to the 
instruments, participants were asked to specify their age, 
ethnicity, and gender so that this information can be 
included in the description of the sample.  
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CHAPTER 4 
 
DATA ANALYSIS 
 
Data Cleaning and Screening 
Three-hundred thirty-four participants (334) completed 
the BAI and other instruments (i.e., EAEAS, EMS, RNEPS, CNS, 
NRS, and SRAN) described in Chapter 3. The response rate for 
all instruments was very high, with no item collecting a 
response from less than 329 out of the 334 participants and 
with the mean, median, and modal number of participants 
completing each item being 332.3, 333, and 333, 
respectively. Consequently, median substitution was utilized 
to fill in data points in the extremely few cases of non-
response.   
One of the assumptions in hypothesis testing with CFA 
is that the variables under investigation meet assumptions 
of normality; otherwise, CFA results cannot be trusted to 
reflect adequately the fit (or lack thereof) of the model 
being examined (Byrne, 2008).  For the BAI, the multivariate 
kurtosis value (z=30.3939) indicated considerable non-
normality in the 48-item dataset, as the standard 
demonstrating normality is a value less than 5.0 (Byrne, 
2008). Moreover, seventeen of the BAI items had univariate 
skewness absolute values greater than one. Fortunately, EQS 
6.1 (i.e., the software that I would later use to conduct 
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the confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) on the BAI data) 
includes an option that permits the user to generate 
reliable statistics that are robust to violations of 
normality assumptions.   As a result, I changed the syntax 
in EQS 6.1 to produce robust goodness-of-fit and other 
statistics. “Goodness-of-fit” statistics indicate the extent 
to which the collected data produces the patterns of 
correlations one would expect given the model being tested. 
In other words, goodness-of-fit statistics reveal how well 
the theory that undergirds an instrument (including the 
presence of hypothesized latent variables and their paths of 
influence on the indicators) is represented in the data 
collected through the instrument. 
Six empirically problematic BAI items (i.e., 6, 13, 33, 
38, 43, and 47) were dropped prior to the first full CFA 
analysis. Items 6, 33, and 38 exhibited extremely low means 
(<2.0), which suggested they might need to be reverse-coded. 
However, reverse coding these items would run contrary to 
the BAI’s underlying theory. Items 13, 43, and 47 were 
singletons, i.e., not sufficiently correlated with any 
factors, and thus not useful for purposes of model testing. 
Testing Hypothesized Models for Construct Validity 
First, I tested the viability of the seven-factor model 
with the remaining 42 indicators by utilizing the CFA in the 
EQS 6.1 statistical software.  CFA is a type of “factor 
analysis,” which is a general term describing a family of 
statistical techniques that are used to detect or confirm 
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the presence and structure of latent or unobservable 
variables (or factors) by examining patterns (or matrices) 
of correlations between observed variables (or indicators). 
In CFA, the factors’ presence and structure (i.e., the 
number of factors, their relationships with each other, and 
their paths of influence on the indicators) are specified in 
advance of data collection, usually based on a theory. CFA, 
in turn, tests how closely the pre-specified (or 
hypothesized) factor structure (also called a model) matches 
the correlation matrices yielded by the actual data. Table 
11 lists the factors (also called dimensions) and their 
associated BAI indicators in the seven-factor model. 
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Table 11 
Seven-factor BAI model (full model) with 42 indicators  
Factor Indicators
Domi-  1. I like to watch animals perform or do tricks. 
nionism 9. All dogs should be well trained.
(DOM) 17. All dogs should be kept on a leash.
 25. A good animal obeys its owners.
 41. I admire people like lion tamers and dogcatchers, who know 
how to catch and control animals. 
Huma-  3. I like animals I can hold and hug.
nism  11. A good animal is always happy to see its owner. 
(HUM) 19. I like to see my pet happy.
 27. Pets should be part of the family.
 35. Animals’ feelings are as important as mine. 
 42. Zoos should show you animals that are cute and friendly.
 45. I like to help sick or hurt animals.
Ecolo- 2. Even insects are important to nature.
 gism/  7. I like learning about the parts of plants and animals.
Scien- 10. It is okay for animals to eat each other to survive.
tism 15. I like learning the names of plants and animals. 
(E/S) 18. I like learning about how animals and plants help one 
another survive. 
 23. I think insects are fascinating.
 26. All plants and animals are important in nature. 
 31. I like watching nature shows on television. 
 34. I like learning about how animals behave in the wild.
Mora-  4. People should not hurt animals.
lism 
(MOR)  
12. At zoos, you should not see the animals unless they want 
you to. 
 20. Plants and animals deserve our protection. 
 28. I admire people who protect plants and animals. 
 36. Human land developers ought to do everything possible to 
avoid removing vegetation and dislocating animals. 
 48. I think it is cruel to keep birds, even parakeets and 
canaries, in cages. 
Natu-  5. I like to go where animals live in the wild. 
ralism 14. I like the sounds of wind and rain.
(NAT) 21. I like the sounds that animals make.
 29. I like the smell of plants and animals in the wild. 
 37. I like the feel of grass and sand under my bare feet.
 46. I like the sound of rivers, streams, and washes. 
 40. I like to swim in lakes, rivers, and oceans. 
Nega- 22. I don’t like getting dirty when I go outside. 
tivism 30. It’s usually too hot or too cold to enjoy being outdoors.
(NEG) 44. Insects that will bite or sting me are everywhere in nature.
Utilita-
rianism 
8. I like useful animals, such as horses, police dogs, and 
seeing-eye dogs. 
(UTI) 16. The best plants and animals are those that people can eat 
or make into other things. 
 24. It’s okay to hunt animals for food.
 32. Plants and animals are around for people to use. 
 39. Nature is good because it gives us many things we need.
 
To evaluate the fit of the 7 hypothesized 
factors/dimensions on the BAI to the data collected, I 
examined the EQS-generated, CFA statistics listed and 
described in Table 12. 
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Table 12 
EQS 6.1 CFA statistics used to evaluate BAI model fit 
Statistic Provides evidence of model fit 
if: 
Average off-diagonal  
standardized residual 
< 2.58
(Byrne, 2008) 
% of standardized residuals 
between 0.2 and -0.2 > 95% 
p value of  
Satorra-Bentler scaled χ2 
(S-B χ2) 
> 0.050 
(Kline, 2005; Byrne, 2008) 
p value of  
Mean- & variance-adjusted χ2 
(MVA χ2) 
> 0.050 
(Kline, 2005; Byrne, 2008) 
Bentler-Bonett normed fit index 
(NFI) 
> 0.949
(Byrne, 2008) 
Comparative fit index (CFI) > 0.949
(Byrne, 2008) 
Bollen's (IFI) fit index > 0.949
(Byrne, 2008) 
Root mean-square error of 
approximation (RMSEA)20 
 
Within RMSEA 90% confidence 
interval (CI) surrounding 0.05 
(excellent fit) or 0.08 (good 
fit) 
(Byrne, 2008) 
 
 
 
 
Evidence of model fit for the seven factor model with 
the 42 indicators listed in Table 11 was mixed, with most 
fit indices suggesting a mediocre fit: S-B χ2 (df=798)= 
2027.53, p=0.00; MVA χ2 (df=155)=393.16, p=0.00; NFI=0.863; 
CFI=0.912 ; and IFI=0.912. However, the average off-diagonal 
standardized residual was a modest 0.0774, and almost 95% of 
the standardized residuals fell between 0.2 and 0.2. 
Moreover, RMSEA=0.068, with a CI spanning from 0.064 to 
0.072, meaning that the probability is 90% that the true 
                                                 
20
 Byrne (2008) notes that RMSEA “has only recently been 
recognized as one of the most informative criteria in 
covariance structure modeling.” One of the virtues of RMSEA 
is that, unlike other fit indices, it produces a 90% 
confidence interval around its point estimates, thus 
providing the researcher more information regarding the 
precision of its estimates. 
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value of RMSEA falls between 0.064 and 0.072, and is greater 
than 90% that the true value of RMSEA is less than the 
threshold for good fit noted in Table 12.   
Next, I tested the viability of the two-factor model 
utilizing EQS 6.1 and the 42 remaining items. Table 13 lists 
the factors and their associated indicators in the two-
factor model. 
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Table 13 
Two-factor BAI model (reduced model) with 42 indicators  
Factor Indicators
Bio-  
philia  
2. Even insects are important to nature.
3. I like animals I can hold and hug. 
(PHI) 4. People should not hurt animals.
 5. I like to go where animals live in the wild. 
 7. I like learning about the parts of plants and animals.
 10. It is okay for animals to eat each other to survive.
 11. A good animal is always happy to see its owner. 
 12. At zoos, you should not see the animals unless they want 
you to. 
 14. I like the sounds of wind and rain.
 15. I like learning the names of plants and animals. 
 18. I like learning about how animals and plants help one 
another survive. 
 19. I like to see my pet happy.
 20. Plants and animals deserve our protection. 
 21. I like the sounds that animals make.
 23. I think insects are fascinating.
 26. All plants and animals are important in nature. 
 27. Pets should be part of the family.
 28. I admire people who protect plants and animals. 
 29. I like the smell of plants and animals in the wild. 
 31. I like watching nature shows on television. 
 34. I like learning about how animals behave in the wild.
 35. Animals’ feelings are as important as mine. 
 36. Human land developers ought to do everything possible to 
avoid removing vegetation and dislocating animals. 
 37. I like the feel of grass and sand under my bare feet.
 40. I like to swim in lakes, rivers, and oceans. 
 42. Zoos should show you animals that are cute and friendly.
 45. I like to help sick or hurt animals.
 46. I like the sound of rivers, streams, and washes. 
 48. I think it is cruel to keep birds, even parakeets and 
canaries, in cages. 
Bio- 1. I like to watch animals perform or do tricks. 
phobia 
(PHO) 
8. I like useful animals, such as horses, police dogs, and 
seeing-eye dogs. 
 9. All dogs should be well trained.
 16. The best plants and animals are those that people can eat 
or make into other things. 
 17. All dogs should be kept on a leash.
 22. I don’t like getting dirty when I go outside. 
 24. It’s okay to hunt animals for food.
 25. A good animal obeys its owners.
 30. It’s usually too hot or too cold to enjoy being outdoors.
 32. Plants and animals are around for people to use. 
 39. Nature is good because it gives us many things we need. 
 41. I admire people like lion tamers and dogcatchers, who know 
how to catch and control animals. 
 44. Insects that will bite or sting me are everywhere in nature.
 
 
Evidence of model fit for the two-factor model with the 
42 indicators listed in Table 13 was nil. Specifically, the 
iterative process through which EQS 6.1 calculates model fit 
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statistics failed to converge, even after 500 iterations.  
This outcome suggests that biophilia, at least as it is 
measured through the BAI, has more than two dimensions. 
Developing a New Model 
Given that the full (i.e., seven-factor) model 
exhibited limited and conflicting evidence of fit and the 
reduced (i.e., two-factor) model produced no evidence of fit 
whatsoever, I decided in consultation with my advisor (and 
the committee) to permit this investigation to become more 
exploratory in nature. Thus, I utilized SPSS 19 statistical 
software to run exploratory factor analyses (EFA)21 and 
thereby develop two new models.  I then utilized CFA to test 
one of these models for construct validity. 
To develop the two new models, I conducted two EFAs on 
the 42-item set of BAI indicators to explore factor-
indicator relationships in potential four-factor and five-
factor solutions.  In the former solution, the four factors 
each had eigenvalues that exceeded 2.0 and that altogether 
accounted for more than 39% of the variance in the 
indicators. In the latter solution, the five factors each 
had eigenvalues that exceeded 1.8 and that altogether 
accounted for 43% of the variance in the indicators. 
Next, I examined the factor loadings of the indicators 
                                                 
21 Like CFA, EFA is a type of factor analysis. However, 
unlike CFA, EFA does not test a pre-specified model. 
Instead, based on the correlations between the indicators, 
EFA produces a model that best fits the data. Thus, EFA 
generates empirically derived models rather than testing 
theoretically derived ones. 
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in the four-factor model to ascertain which indicators did 
and did not exhibit productive associations with the 
underlying factors in a rotated component matrix. (I chose 
the four-factor model because it was more parsimonious than 
the five-factor model while at the same time accounting for 
nearly as much variance in the indicators.) An indicator 
with a productive association loaded substantially (i.e., at 
a value of 0.4 or higher) on at least one factor without 
loading even minimally (i.e., at an absolute value of 0.3 or 
higher) on any other factor. In the four-factor solution, 23 
indicators exhibited productive associations and thus were 
retained for testing in a CFA model.  
Table 14 lists the factors and their associated 
indicators in the new four-factor BAI model. 
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Table 14 
Four-factor BAI model with 23 indicators  
Factor Indicators
Curiosity 5. I like to go where animals live in the wild.
(A hybrid of 
Naturalism  
7. I like learning about the parts of plants and 
animals. 
and 
Ecologism/ 
15. I like learning the names of plants and 
animals. 
Scientism) 18. I like learning about how animals and plants 
help one another survive. 
 21. I like the sounds that animals make. 
 23. I think insects are fascinating. 
 31. I like watching nature shows on television.
 34. I like learning about how animals behave in 
the wild. 
 40. I like to swim in lakes, rivers, and oceans.
Morality 4. People should not hurt animals. 
(Moralism with a 20. Plants and animals deserve our protection.
dash of 
Humanism)  
28. I admire people who protect plants and 
animals. 
 35. Animals’ feelings are as important as mine.
 36. Human land developers ought to do everything 
possible to avoid removing vegetation and 
dislocating animals. 
Necessity 2. Even insects are important to nature. 
(Hybrid of 
Utilita- 
10. It is okay for animals to eat each other to 
survive. 
rianism and 
Ecologism/ 
39. Nature is good because it gives us many things 
we need.  
Scientism)  
Security 9. All dogs should be well trained. 
(Mostly 
Dominionism 
11. A good animal is always happy to see its 
owner. 
with a splash of 25. A good animal obeys its owners. 
Humanism and 
Negativism) 
41. I admire people like lion tamers and 
dogcatchers, who know how to catch and 
control animals. 
 42. Zoos should show you animals that are cute 
and friendly. 
 44. Insects that will bite or sting me are 
everywhere in nature. 
 
 
Testing the New Model for Construct Validity 
Although the S-B χ2 and MVA χ2 p values for the new 
model described in Table 14 did not exceed 0.05, the values 
obtained through CFA for nearly all the other fit indicators 
and fit indices provided evidence of good-to-excellent model 
fit. The average off-diagonal standardized residual was only 
0.0619; almost 98% of the standardized residuals fell 
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between 0.2 and 0.2; NFI=0.925; CFI=0.963; IFI=0.963; and 
RMSEA=0.051, with a CI spanning from 0.044 to 0.059. (As 
previously noted in Table 12, 0.05 and 0.08, respectively, 
are the RMSEA thresholds for good and excellent fit.) 
Cronbach’s alpha reliability coefficients for the Curiosity, 
Morality, Necessity, and Security subscales were 0.874, 
0.778, 0.444, and 0.575, respectively. The reliabilities for 
the Curiosity and Morality subscales were good, while the 
reliabilities for the Necessity and Security subscales did 
not meet the recommended minimum of .70. Nevertheless, the 
later values were not atypical or extreme when compared to 
corresponding values for well-established measures of 
environmental attitudes and beliefs (cf., Tables 9 and 10). 
Testing the New Model for Convergent & Discriminant Validity 
To collect evidence of convergent and discriminant 
validity for the new model, I examined the correlations 
between each of the new model’s four factors and the 
subscales of the already established measures described in 
Chapter 3. However, before I could run the necessary 
correlational analyses, I had to create subject scores for 
each of new model’s factors. To accomplish this task, I had 
three options: 
1) Equally weight each subject’s response to each item; 
2) Weight each subject’s response to each item by the 
factor loading in the rotated component matrix that 
SPSS generated as part of the EFA I conducted 
during the development of the new model; and 
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3) Weight each subject’s response to each item by the 
factor loading in the standardized solution that 
EQS generated as part of the CFA I conducted on the 
new model. 
I utilized all three options rather than choose between 
them. Table 15 shows the correlations between the new mo-
del’s four BAI factors and the three subscales--Ecocentric 
(ECO), Anthropocentric (ANT), and Apathy Toward Nature 
(APA)--of the Ecocentric/ Anthropocentric/ Environmental 
Apathy Scale (EAEAS). Correlations in boldface evince the 
presence of convergent validity. Correlations in italics 
evince the presence of discriminant validity. A comparison 
across the three options showed a very consistent pattern; 
thus all of the three options suggested the same 
interpretation of results. 
 
Table 15 
Correlations between BAI factors and EAEAS subscales  
BAI Subscale 
(Weighting option 
utilized) 
EAEAS ECO EAEAS APA EAEAS ANT
Curiosity (Equal) 0.613** -0.330**  -0.054**
Morality (Equal) 0.579** -0.537** -0.150**
Necessity (Equal) 0.439** -0.261** -0.056**
Security (Equal) -0.039**  0.268** 0.446**
Curiosity (EQS) 0.602** -0.331** -0.056**
Morality (EQS) 0.583** -0.541** -0.149**
Necessity (EQS) 0.446** -0.275** -0.066**
Security (EQS) -0.035** 0.230** 0.422**
Curiosity (SPSS) 0.601** -0.331** -0.059**
Morality (SPSS) 0.578** -0.533** -0.150**
Necessity (SPSS) 0.427** -0.249** -0.060**
Security (SPSS) -0.039** 0.260** 0.446**
**p < 0.01 
(2-tailed)  
*p < 0.05
(2-tailed) 
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Table 16 shows the correlations between the new model’s four 
BAI factors and the three subscales--Biospheric (BIO), 
Altruistic (ALT), and Egotistic (EGO)--of the Environmental 
Motives Scale (EMS). 
 
 
Table 16 
Correlations between BAI factors and EMS subscales  
BAI Subscale 
(Weighting option 
utilized) 
EMS BIO EMS ALT EMS EGO
Curiosity (Equal) 0.387** 0.072** -0.084**
Morality (Equal) 0.553** 0.216** 0.091**
Necessity (Equal) 0.263** 0.030** -0.057**
Security (Equal) -0.056** 0.133** 0.253**
Curiosity (EQS) 0.392** 0.079** -0.083**
Morality (EQS) 0.556** 0.220** 0.095**
Necessity (EQS) 0.278** 0.031** -0.065**
Security (EQS) -0.047** 0.129** 0.258**
Curiosity (SPSS) 0.392** 0.078** -0.083**
Morality (SPSS) 0.550** 0.216** 0.095**
Necessity (SPSS) 0.246** 0.017** -0.065**
Security (SPSS) -0.055** 0.134** 0.258**
**p < 0.01 
(2-tailed)  
*p < 0.05
(2-tailed) 
 
 
 
Table 17 shows the correlations between the new model’s  
factors and the Revised New Ecological Paradigm Scale 
(RNEPS). 
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Table 17 
Correlations between BAI factors and RNEPS  
BAI Subscale 
(Weighting option utilized) 
RNEPS 
Curiosity (Equal) 0.218** 
Morality (Equal) 0.536** 
Necessity (Equal) 0.174** 
Security (Equal) -0.248** 
Curiosity (EQS) 0.216** 
Morality (EQS) 0.537** 
Necessity (EQS) 0.184** 
Security (EQS) -0.234** 
Curiosity (SPSS) 0.215** 
Morality (SPSS) 0.534** 
Necessity (SPSS) 0.166** 
Security (SPSS) -0.249** 
**p < 0.01 
(2-tailed)  
*p < 0.05
(2-tailed) 
 
 
Table 18 shows the correlations between the new model’s 
factors and the Connectedness to Nature Scale (CNS). 
 
Table 18 
Correlations between BAI factors and CNS  
BAI Subscale 
(Weighting option utilized) 
CNS 
Curiosity (Equal) 0.490** 
Morality (Equal) 0.594** 
Necessity (Equal) 0.310** 
Security (Equal) -0.096** 
Curiosity (EQS) 0.490** 
Morality (EQS) 0.596** 
Necessity (EQS) 0.317** 
Security (EQS) -0.087** 
Curiosity (SPSS) 0.488** 
Morality (SPSS) 0.596** 
Necessity (SPSS) 0.300** 
Security (SPSS) -0.097** 
**p < 0.01 
(2-tailed)  
*p < 0.05
(2-tailed) 
 
Table 19 shows the correlations between the new model’s 
factors and the three subscales--Self (SEL), Perspective 
(PER), or Experience (EXP)--of the Nature Relatedness Scale 
(NRS). 
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Table 19 
Correlations between BAI factors and NRS subscales  
BAI Subscale 
(Weighting option 
utilized) 
NRS SEL NRS PER NRS EXP
Curiosity (Equal) 0.550** 0.238** 0.557**
Morality (Equal) 0.543** 0.529** 0.155**
Necessity (Equal) 0.293** 0.129** 0.227**
Security (Equal) -0.044** -0.228** -0.040**
Curiosity (EQS) 0.550** 0.240** 0.561**
Morality (EQS) 0.543** 0.530** 0.157**
Necessity (EQS) 0.305** 0.138** 0.227**
Security (EQS) -0.043** -0.192** -0.045**
Curiosity (SPSS) 0.548** 0.239** 0.564**
Morality (SPSS) 0.546** 0.528** 0.154**
Necessity (SPSS) 0.283** 0.121** 0.227**
Security (SPSS) -0.046** -0.220** -0.043**
**p < 0.01 
(2-tailed)  
*p < 0.05
(2-tailed) 
 
 
To facilitate analysis, data from each item in the Survey of 
Recreational Activities in Nature (SRAN) was re-coded 
according to the scheme depicted in Table 20.  
 
Table 20 
Recoding of SRAN data 
Original Response Recoded as 
0 times 0.0 
1 to 2 times 1.5 
3 to 4 times 3.5 
5 to 6 times 5.5 
7 to 8 times 7.5 
9 to 10 times 9.5 
11 or more times 11.5 
 
 
Next, the data was summed across items for each SRAN part, 
i.e., across Part 1 (participation in nature-related 
activities in the past 12 months) and across Part 2 
(participation in nature-related activities between ages 6 
and 18). Table 21 shows the correlations between the new 
model’s four BAI factors and the two parts of the SRAN. 
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Table 21 
Correlations between BAI factors and SRAN 
BAI Subscale
(Weighting option utilized) 
SRAN, Part 1
Past 12 months 
SRAN, Part 2
Ages 6 to 18 
Curiosity (Equal) 0.407** 0.320**
Morality (Equal) 0.093** 0.056**
Necessity (Equal) 0.156** 0.100**
Security (Equal) 0.044**  0.029**
Curiosity (EQS) 0.397** 0.311**
Morality (EQS) 0.093** 0.057**
Necessity (EQS) 0.154** 0.100**
Security (EQS) 0.046**  0.034**
Curiosity (SPSS) 0.400** 0.314**
Morality (SPSS) 0.090** 0.053**
Necessity (SPSS) 0.157** 0.096**
Security (SPSS) 0.044**  0.030**
**p < 0.01 
(2-tailed)  
*p < 0.05
(2-tailed) 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
DISCUSSION  
 
 The purpose of this study was to construct and validate 
a reliable, stable, and valid instrument, called the 
Biophilic Attitudes Inventory (BAI) that utilized Stephen 
Kellert’s typology of biophilic attitudes, which are 
described in Table 1 and which Kellert spent more than two 
decades attempting to measure via the development and 
administration of various survey instruments. Kellert argued 
that these attitudes were a manifestation of "biophilia," 
which, according to the naturalist E.O. Wilson, is an innate 
predisposition among humans to connect with other forms of 
life, especially in ways that have proven advantageous from 
an evolutionary standpoint. 
Viability of BAI as a Seven- or Two-factor Instrument 
 The BAI began as a 48-item measure (subsequently 
reduced to 42 items, as previously discussed, because six 
items needed to be eliminated for empirical reasons) that 
ostensibly gauged a respondent’s biophilic attitudes on 
seven Kellert-based dimensions or factors: Naturalism, 
Moralism, Ecologism-Scientism, Negativism, Utilitarianism, 
Humanism, and Dominionism (cf., Table A.1). The viability of 
this seven-dimension model, as well as that of an 
alternative two-dimension model (cf., Table A.2), was tested 
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via confirmatory factor analysis (CFA). Unfortunately, 
evidence of viability (defined in terms of model fit) was 
mixed for the seven-factor model and non-existent for the 
two-factor model.  
The weakness of the seven-factor model and total 
unviability of the two-factor model were consistent with the 
results obtained by other researchers who have attempted to 
develop instruments based on Kellert’s typology (cf., Table 
6), with the number of factors identified in their studies 
ranging between three and six (Drews, 2002; Thompson & 
Mintzes, 2002; Rauwald & Moore, 2002; Barney et. al., 2005; 
Lukas & Ross, 2005; Slovokia, Prokop, & Kubiatko, 2008). 
Considered collectively, the results of those studies and 
this dissertation strongly suggest that biophilia as a 
measurable construct is multidimensional but far less so 
than the models proposed in Kellert’s work, which featured 
between seven and ten dimensions.   
Investigation of a New Model 
 Since neither the seven-dimensional or two-dimensional 
model was stable, I utilized exploratory factor analysis 
(EFA) to empirically generate a new model that better fit 
the data. The result of that effort was a four-factor 
solution that utilized 23 of the BAI indicators (cf., Table 
14), but not precisely according to Kellert’s theoretical 
framework since items from different BAI dimensions were 
sometimes drawn together in the new set of four factors. For 
example, the first factor produced in the EFA included items 
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formerly grouped in the BAI Naturalism dimension or the BAI 
Ecologism/Scientism dimension. As a result, I named each of 
the four factors based on the theme that the items 
associated with it seemed collectively to suggest (cf., 
Table 14). The factor Curiosity includes a blend of 
indicators that were originally part of the BAI Naturalism 
or Ecologism/Scientism dimensions and suggests the 
respondent has an intense interest in learning about plants 
and animals, especially by spending time in natural 
settings. The Morality factor subsumes mostly indicators 
originally assigned to BAI Moralism. Thus, it is appropriate 
to declare, for all intents and purposes, the Morality 
factor and the Moralism dimension as synonymous. The 
Security factor includes indicators from the BAI 
Dominionism, Humanism, and Negativism dimensions. However, 
all these indicators focused on a common theme: nature is 
dangerous or undesirable when not subject to human control. 
The Necessity factor contains indicators from the BAI 
Utilitarianism and Ecologism/Scientism dimensions. The 
Necessity items suggest that respondents strong on this 
dimension have a very practical, dispassionate view of 
nature. 
Items Excluded from the New Model 
 Nineteen of the original BAI items were not included in 
the alternative model because, in the EFA analysis, they 
failed to load strongly on any of the four new factors or 
they loaded on more than one factor (i.e., cross-loaded). 
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Table 22 depicts the patterns of non-loading and cross-
loading that occurred. 
 
 
Table 22 
BAI items not loading cleanly or at all 
Factors X C M N S
None (X) 12,14,16, 
17,22,30, 
48 
 
Curiosity (C) --  
Morality (M) 3, 45 --  
Necessity (N) 29,37,46 24,26 --  
Security (S) 1,8 19,27 1, 3222 --
 
 
The failure of many of these items to load strongly or 
cleanly--and thus not function well as indicators in a new 
instrument--can be understood in many instances through a 
close inspection of the items’ wordings. As shown in Table 
22, items 12, 16, 17, and 48 did not load strongly on any of 
the four factors. The content of these four items are 
similar in that they represent positions with which most 
respondents could not express strong agreement or 
disagreement. For example, in considering item #12 (At zoos, 
you should not see the animals unless they want you to.), it 
is possible that respondents were reluctant to agree because 
seeing animals is the primary reasons most people visit zoos 
but also were hesitant to disagree as that might imply 
endorsing the practice of forcing captive animals into 
                                                 
22
 Item #1 loads on C, N, and S. Item #32 loads on M, N, and 
S. 
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public view to satisfy the whims of zoo patrons. Similarly, 
item #17 (All dogs should be kept on a leash) likely failed 
to elicit much agreement or disagreement because of the wide 
variety of circumstances under which respondents, regardless 
of how they feel about the nature and parameters of proper 
relationships between humans and canines, might encounter or 
interact with dogs. 
 Items 14, 22, and 30, which also failed to load stron-
gly on any of the factors, were all focused specifically on 
the sensory experience of being outdoors, but none of these 
items made any reference to flora or fauna. For example, 
item 14 focuses on the sounds of wind and rain; item 22, on 
being outdoors and one’s feeling of cleanliness; and item 
30, one’s typical level of comfort with outdoor 
temperatures. The lack of strong loading by these items 
suggests that respondents’ attitudes toward nature are not 
shaped significantly by physical sensations associated with 
personal hygiene or meteorological conditions.  
 Items 24 and 26 crossloaded on the Morality and the 
Necessity factors. Item 24 (It’s okay to hunt animals for 
food.) loaded negatively on the Morality factor but positi-
vely on the Necessity factor, drawing disagreement from 
respondents with the former attitudinal trait and agreement 
from those with the latter trait but, for purposes of 
instrument development, making it difficult to ascertain to 
which trait any response to this item should be ascribed. 
Item 26 (All plants and animals are important to nature.) 
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loaded higher on Necessity than on Morality, but it is easy 
to see how persons with high levels of the Morality attitude 
and those with high levels of the Necessity attitude might 
interpret this item in different ways but agree with it 
nonetheless. 
 Items 19 (I like to see my pet happy.) and 27 (Pets 
should be part of the family.) loaded strongly on both 
Morality and Security. Persons with high levels of Morality 
may have agreed with item 19 due to a belief that pets 
deserve some measure of happiness or contentment while 
persons with high levels of Security may view happy pets as 
non-threatening to and protective of their owners. To 
persons with high levels of Morality, pets who are family 
members are afforded a status equal to (or nearly equal to) 
the humans with which it resides. In contrast, to persons 
with high levels of Security, pets that are part of the 
family are likely seen as more likely to defend other family 
members, much like wolves defend other members of their 
pack. Thus, items 19 and 27 elicit agreement from both 
Morality and Security-driven respondents, though for very 
different reasons. 
 Items 1 (I like to watch animals perform or do tricks.) 
and 8 (I like useful animals, such as horses, police dogs, 
and seeing-eye dogs.) loaded strongly on both Curiosity and 
Security. These items may appeal to respondents with high 
levels of Curiosity because the situations they depict are 
opportunities during which humans interact with animals, 
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while respondents with high levels of Security view these 
situations as instances where potentially dangerous animals 
are aptly controlled by humans and made to promote human 
safety. 
Correlations Between the BAI New Model’s Four Factors and 
Other Environmental Attitude Scales 
 As shown in Tables 15 to 19 and Table 21, correlations 
between the new model’s factors and other environmental 
attitude scales provided a considerable amount of evidence 
of convergent and discriminant validity for the new model.  
 The BAI Curiosity factor correlated strongly (i.e., |r| 
> 0.4), positively, and significantly with the EAEAS ECO 
subscale, which measures respondents’ ecocentric attitudes 
toward nature, i.e., "appreciating nature for its own sake, 
positive affect and stress reduction associated with nature, 
and seeing connectedness between humans and animals"(Gagnon-
Thompson & Barton, 1994); the EMS BIO subscale, which 
measures the extent to which a respondents concern for the 
environment is biospheric, i.e., motivated by concern for 
other living things; the CNS scale, which measures ". . . an 
individual’s affective, experiential connection to nature" 
(Mayer & McPherson-Frantz, 2004); the NRS SEL subscale, 
which represents "an internalized identification with 
nature, reflecting feelings and thoughts about one’s 
personal connection to nature"(Nisbet, et. al., 2008); the 
NRS EXP subscale, which signifies the respondents’ feeling 
of "physical familiarity with the natural world ... level of 
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comfort with and desire to be out in nature"(Nisbet, et. 
al., 2008); and the SRAN part 1 subscale, on which 
respondents report their recent participation in common, 
nature-related, leisure-time activities. Conversely, BAI 
Curiosity was nearly uncorrelated (i.e., r < |0.1|) with EMS 
ALT (which measures the extent to which a respondent’s 
concern for the environment is altruistic, i.e., motivated 
by concern for other people) and EMS EGO (which measures the 
extent to which a respondent’s concern for the environment 
is egoistic, i.e., motivated by self interest). 
 The BAI Morality factor correlated strongly, 
positively, and significantly with the EAEAS ECO subscale; 
the EMS BIO subscale; the RNEPS scale, which measures 
respondents’ "‘primitive beliefs’ about the nature of the 
earth and humanity’s relationship with it"(Dunlap, et. al., 
2000); the CNS scale; the NRS SEL subscale; and the NRS PER 
subscale, which measures the extent to which the respondent 
possesses an "external, nature-related worldview, a sense of 
agency concerning individual human actions and their impact 
on all living things" (Nisbet, et. al., 2008). In contrast, 
BAI Morality is strongly, significantly, and negatively 
correlated with the EAEAS APA subscale, which measures 
respondents’ apathy toward nature, i.e., "lack of interest 
in environmental issues, and a general belief that problems 
in this area have been exaggerated"(Gagnon-Thompson & 
Barton, 1994). 
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 The BAI Necessity factor correlated strongly, 
significantly, and positively with the EAEAS ECO subscale, 
the CNS scale, and the NRS SEL subscale. 
 The BAI Security factor correlated strongly, 
significantly, and positively with the EAEAS ANT subscale, 
which measures respondents’ anthropocentric attitudes toward 
nature, i.e., "valuing nature because of the material or 
physical benefits it can provide to humans" (Gagnon-Thompson 
& Barton, 1994). 
 All of the aforementioned correlations between the new 
model’s four subscales and already established measures of 
environmental attitudes are exactly what one would expect. 
The inspection of these correlations yielded no surprises. 
Thus, it is credible to infer that the BAI new model exhi-
bits a fair amount of convergent and discriminant validity. 
Implications for Theory 
 Considering the results of the CFA and other related 
studies, it is reasonable to conclude that biophilia as a 
measurable construct is multidimensional but not to the 
extent proposed in Kellert’s work. Furthermore, the results 
of EFA provide some clues regarding how this construct might 
be better conceptualized. For example, the EFA results 
support the existence of Kellert’s Moralism dimension 
(relabeled as “Morality” in the EFA results of this 
dissertation). Morality correlated:  
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 Strongly and positively with the Ecocentric/ 
Anthropocentric/ Environmental Apathy Scale (EAEAS) 
Ecocentric subscale (cf., Table 15); 
 Strongly and negatively with the EAEAS Environmental 
Apathy subscale (cf., Table 15);  
 Strongly and positively with the Environmental Motives 
Scale (EMS) Biospheric subscale (cf., Table 16); 
 Strongly and positively with the Revised New Ecological 
Paradigm Scale (cf., Table 17); and  
 Strongly and positively with the Connectedness to 
Nature Scale (cf., Table 18).    
The EFA results also strongly suggest that Kellert’s 
Naturalism and Ecologism/Scientism are actually a single 
dimension (relabeled as “Curiosity” in the EFA results 
section of this dissertation), a finding that on its face 
makes considerable sense in that many people who enjoy 
spending time in natural settings often possess a strong 
interest in understanding wild fauna and flora. Moreover, in 
the EFA results, we see that Curiosity correlated: 
 Strongly and positively with the EAEAS  Ecocentric 
subscale (cf., Table 15);  
 Moderately and negatively with the EAEAS Environmental 
Apathy subscale (cf., Table 15);  
 Moderately and positively with the EMS Biospheric 
subscale (cf., Table 16); 
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 Strongly and positively with the Connectedness to 
Nature Scale (cf., Table 18); 
 Strongly and positively with the Nature Relatedness 
Scale (NRS) Self and Experience subscales (cf., Table 
19); and 
 Moderately and positively with both parts of the Survey 
of Recreational Activities in Nature (SRAN).    
However, the EFA did not produce strong empirical 
evidence for the existence of any of Kellert’s other 
dimensions. 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
Implications for Future Research 
The failure of the two-factor model in this study 
suggests that biophilic attitudes--at least in so far as 
they can be measured by pen-and-paper, self-report 
instruments--are fairly complex. However, the weak 
performance of the seven-factor model suggests that 
attitudes are likely not as bifurcated as Kellert’s 
theoretical framework implies. Of course, limitations of the 
BAI as an instrument may be at least partly responsible for 
these results. For example, it is possible that the wording 
in some of the BAI items did not adequately or sufficiently 
represent the Kellert dimension with which it was meant to 
be associated. Alternatively, ineffective item wording may 
have caused some items to correlate with the wrong Kellert 
dimensions or strongly correlate with more than one 
dimension. Moreover, results of this study may have been 
impacted by the circumstances under which the BAI was 
administered (i.e., online, through the online Survey Monkey 
portal, which has limited item randomization capabilities). 
Additionally, characteristics of the sample itself may have 
influence the results, as the persons who completed the BAI 
were self-selected and somewhat homogenous in terms of their 
educational-background characteristics. Consequently, future 
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attempts to empirically investigate the viability of 
Kellert’s theoretical framework would probably benefit from 
a more extensive and systematic review of instrument items 
prior to data collection to ensure, as much as possible, 
strong and unambiguous construct representation.  
Limitations in this study associated with instrument 
administration could also be ameliorated by creating 
multiple forms of the BAI and the other instruments, with 
each form presenting both instruments—and items within the 
instruments--in different orders. Taking this strategy a 
step further, the researcher could utilize both online and 
in-person versions of each form, thus permitting the 
researcher to detect whether the data-collection modality 
(i.e., electronic vs. hardcopy; from a remote, unknown 
location vs. in front of a live researcher; without any time 
constraint vs. within a fixed amount of time; and so on) 
significantly influences the results of the validation 
effort. However, any researcher utilizing multiple forms 
and/or multiple versions of each form would need to ensure 
that the overall sample size and individual group sizes 
(e.g., electronic vs. hardcopy respondents) are sufficient 
for the statistical tests he or she plans to run. 
Finally, as previously noted the nature of the sample 
utilized in this dissertation make it difficult to 
generalize the results to any broader population. Future 
research with randomly selected samples of respondents from 
a variety of backgrounds would help make the case that the 
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results can apply to more than university undergraduates 
studying education.  
The four-factor BAI model constructed through the EFA 
may indeed be the most parsimonious description of biophilic 
attitudes, but to declare it so would be quite premature. 
First, the four-factor BAI model will need to be tested with 
additional samples to eliminate the possibility that the fit 
achieved in this study was merely a chance occurrence. 
However, before any new administrations of the BAI can 
occur, additional items for the Necessity subscale will need 
to be developed to increase the number of indicators 
associated with this factor and, thereby, increase its 
reliability, which in this study was only 0.444. Current 
items in the Security factor should also be closely 
inspected in an effort to ascertain which caused the 
subscale’s reliability not to exceed 0.575. 
Conclusions 
The present research leads to two conclusions related to the 
theoretical and practical utility of the BAI.  Regarding 
theory, the BAI was constructed to assess the seven 
dimensions proposed by Kellert (Naturalism, Humanism, 
Moralism, Dominionism, Utilitarianism, Negativism, and 
Ecologism/Scientism).  Given the poor fit of the BAI to the 
seven-factor model suggested by Kellert’s theory, it is 
doubtful that the theory is viable.  The complete failure of 
the two-factor model (Biophilia and Biophobia), as well as 
the mixed results of the four-factor model (Curiosity, 
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Morality, Necessity, and Security) generated in the 
exploratory analysis, suggest a multiple-factor solution of 
some type, yet do not provide enough specificity to clearly 
articulate the nature of these factors. Support was 
particularly weak for the existence of a Necessity factor, 
and by extension for the Kellert dimension (Utilitarianism) 
with which Necessity is on theoretical grounds most closely 
associated, suggesting little or no inclination on the part 
of BAI respondents to affiliate with nature on the basis of 
its perceived usefulness. Of course, since most of the BAI 
respondents were urban residents, this result may be merely 
a sampling artifact. However, this result, if confirmed in 
future studies, could point to an attitudinal shift wherein 
people perceive and affiliate with nature less in terms of 
its utility value.  Nevertheless and overall, the present 
findings suggest the need for a revised theory and a better 
articulation of dimensions related to biophilia and 
biophobia. 
 Regarding practice, the four-factor solution of the BAI 
showed acceptable construct validity, as well as good 
convergent and discriminant validity with other related 
measures.  Consequently, the BAI may be useful to 
environmental educators when used in conjunction with other 
instruments until a better version of the BAI is developed, 
or a new instrument based on a revised theory is available. 
Currently, there are no viable instruments that assess 
biophilic and biophobic attitudes among adults; therefore, 
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the BAI may provide practical utility when assessing these 
beliefs. Thus, the BAI may serve as a tool that 
environmental educators can utilize, while developing and 
adjusting lesson plans, to assess and capitalize upon (or 
counteract, if necessary) the biophilic attitudes of their 
students. However, any user of the BAI in its current form 
should do so cautiously and remain mindful of the unsettled 
state of the underlying theory, the instrument’s present 
impotency vis-à-vis the detection of Necessity-related 
attitudes, and the biases introduced into this investigation 
of the BAI’s validity by the particular characteristics of 
the non-probability sample that was utilized.  
 
 
 109 
APPENDIX 
 
INSTRUMENTS 
 
Figure A.1 displays the instructions, items, and res-
ponse options for the Biophilic Attitudes Inventory (BAI). 
 
Figure A.1 
Biophilic Attitudes Inventory   
DIRECTIONS: Please circle the number that indicates how 
much you agree or disagree with each of the following 
statements. 
 
Strongly 
Disagree
Slightly 
Disagree
Neutral 
Slightly 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
01. I like to watch animals 
perform or do tricks. 
1 2 3 4 5 
02. Even insects are important 
to nature. 
1 2 3 4 5 
03. I like animals I can hold 
and hug. 
1 2 3 4 5 
04. People should not hurt animals. 1 2 3 4 5 
05. I like to go where animals 
live in the wild. 
1 2 3 4 5 
06. We should get rid of all 
poisonous animals like 
rattlesnakes and scorpions. 
1 2 3 4 5 
07. I like learning about the 
parts of plants and animals. 
1 2 3 4 5 
08. I like useful animals, such 
as horses, police dogs, and 
seeing-eye dogs. 
1 2 3 4 5 
09. All dogs should be well 
trained. 
1 2 3 4 5 
10. It is okay for animals to 
eat each other to survive. 
1 2 3 4 5 
11. A good animal is always 
happy to see its owner. 
1 2 3 4 5 
12. At zoos, you should not see 
the animals unless they 
want you to. 
1 2 3 4 5 
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DIRECTIONS: Please circle the number that indicates how 
much you agree or disagree with each of the following 
statements. 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Slightly 
Disagree 
Neutral 
Slightly 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
13. A good animal has no owner 
and lives in the wild. 
1 2 3 4 5 
14. I like the sounds of wind 
and rain. 
1 2 3 4 5 
15. I like learning the names of 
plants and animals. 
1 2 3 4 5 
16. The best plants and animals 
are those that people can eat 
or make into other things. 
1 2 3 4 5 
17. All dogs should be kept on 
a leash. 
1 2 3 4 5 
18. I like learning about how 
animals and plants help one 
another survive. 
1 2 3 4 5 
19. I like to see my pet happy. 1 2 3 4 5 
20. Plants and animals deserve 
our protection. 
1 2 3 4 5 
21. I like the sounds that 
animals make. 
1 2 3 4 5 
22. I don’t like getting dirty 
when I go outside. 
1 2 3 4 5 
23. I think insects are 
fascinating. 
1 2 3 4 5 
24. It's okay to hunt animals for 
food. 
1 2 3 4 5 
25. A good animal obeys its owners. 1 2 3 4 5 
26. All plants and animals are 
important in nature. 
1 2 3 4 5 
27. Pets should be part of the 
family. 
1 2 3 4 5 
28. I admire people who protect 
plants and animals. 
1 2 3 4 5 
29. I like the smell of plants 
and animals in the wild. 
1 2 3 4 5 
30. It’s usually too hot or too 
cold to enjoy being outdoors. 
1 2 3 4 5 
31. I like watching nature shows 
on television. 
1 2 3 4 5 
32. Plants and animals are around 
for people to use. 
1 2 3 4 5 
33. Wild animals should be 
captured and tamed. 
1 2 3 4 5 
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DIRECTIONS: Please circle the number that indicates how 
much you agree or disagree with each of the following 
statements. 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Slightly 
Disagree 
Neutral 
Slightly 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
34. I like learning about how 
animals behave in the wild. 
1 2 3 4 5 
35. Animals’ feelings are as 
important as mine. 
1 2 3 4 5 
36. Human land developers ought 
to do everything possible 
to avoid removing 
vegetation and dislocating 
animals. 
1 2 3 4 5 
37. I like the feel of grass 
and sand under my bare 
feet. 
1 2 3 4 5 
38. We should get rid of insects 
as much as we can. 
1 2 3 4 5 
39. Nature is good because it 
gives us many things we need. 
1 2 3 4 5 
40. I like to swim in lakes, 
rivers, and oceans. 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
41. I admire people like lion 
tamers and dogcatchers, who 
know how to catch and 
control animals. 
1 2 3 4 5 
42. Zoos should show you 
animals that are cute and 
friendly. 
1 2 3 4 5 
43. I am really bothered by the 
sight of weeds in a lawn. 
1 2 3 4 5 
44. Insects that will bite or 
sting me are everywhere in 
nature. 
1 2 3 4 5 
45. I like to help sick or hurt 
animals. 
1 2 3 4 5 
46. I like the sound of rivers, 
streams, and washes. 
1 2 3 4 5 
47. Animals in the wild are 
dangerous. 
1 2 3 4 5 
48. I think it is cruel to keep 
birds, even parakeets and 
canaries, in cages. 
1 2 3 4 5 
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Each BAI item’s coding (i.e., standard or reverse) and 
its associated subscales are shown in Table A.1. 
 
 
 
 
Table A.1 
Biophilic Attitudes Inventory (BAI) item codings and 
subscales  
BAI Item Coding Subscale23  Subscale24
1. I like to watch animals 
perform or do tricks. 
Standard DOM PHO
9. All dogs should be well 
trained. 
Standard DOM PHO
17. All dogs should be kept 
on a leash. 
Standard DOM PHO
25. A good animal obeys its 
owners. 
Standard DOM PHO
33. Wild animals should be 
captured and tamed. 
Standard DOM PHO
41. I admire people like lion 
tamers and dogcatchers, 
who know how to catch and 
control animals. 
Standard DOM PHO
2. Even insects are important 
to nature. 
Standard E/S PHI
7. I like learning about the 
parts of plants and 
animals. 
Standard E/S PHI
10. It is okay for animals 
to eat each other to 
survive. 
Standard E/S PHI
15. I like learning the names 
of plants and animals. 
Standard E/S PHI
18. I like learning about how 
animals and plants help 
one another survive. 
Standard E/S PHI 
                                                 
23
 Dominionism (DOM), Ecologism/Scientism (E/S), Humanism 
(HUM), Moralism (MOR), Naturalism (NAT), Negativism (NEG), 
Utilitarianism (UTI), the seven dimensions noted in 
Hypotheses #1 and #2 in Chapter 2. 
24Biophilia (PHI) and Biophobia (PHO), the two dimensions 
noted in Hypothesis #3 and #4 in Chapter 2.  
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BAI Item Coding Subscale23  Subscale24
23. I think insects are 
fascinating.* 
Standard E/S PHI
26. All plants and animals 
are important in 
nature. 
Standard E/S PHI
31. I like watching nature 
shows on television. 
Standard E/S PHI
34. I like learning about 
how animals behave in 
the wild. 
Standard E/S PHI
3. I like animals I can 
hold and hug. 
Standard HUM PHI
11. A good animal is always 
happy to see its owner. 
Standard HUM PHI
19. I like to see my pet 
happy. 
Standard HUM PHI
27. Pets should be part of 
the family. 
Standard HUM PHI
35. Animals’ feelings are 
as important as mine. 
Standard HUM PHI 
42. Zoos should show you 
animals that are cute 
and friendly. 
Standard HUM PHI 
45. I like to help sick or 
hurt animals. 
Standard HUM PHI 
4. People should not hurt 
animals. 
Standard MOR PHI 
12. At zoos, you should not 
see the animals unless 
they want you to. 
Standard MOR PHI 
20. Plants and animals 
deserve our protection. 
Standard MOR PHI 
28. I admire people who 
protect plants and 
animals. 
Standard MOR PHI 
36. Human land developers 
ought to do everything 
possible to avoid 
removing vegetation and 
dislocating animals. 
Standard MOR PHI 
48. I think it is cruel to 
keep birds, even 
parakeets and canaries, 
in cages.* 
Standard MOR PHI 
5. I like to go where 
animals live in the 
wild. 
Standard NAT PHI 
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BAI Item Coding Subscale23  Subscale24
13. A good animal has no 
owner and lives in the 
wild. 
Standard NAT PHI 
14. I like the sounds of 
wind and rain. 
Standard NAT PHI 
21. I like the sounds that 
animals make. 
Standard NAT PHI 
29. I like the smell of 
plants and animals in 
the wild. 
Standard NAT PHI 
37. I like the feel of 
grass and sand under my 
bare feet. 
Standard NAT PHI 
46. I like the sound of 
rivers, streams, and 
washes. 
Standard NAT PHI 
40. I like to swim in 
lakes, rivers, and 
oceans. 
Standard NAT PHI 
6. We should get rid of all 
poisonous animals like 
rattlesnakes and 
scorpions. 
Standard NEG PHO 
47. Animals in the wild are 
dangerous. 
Standard NEG PHO 
22. I don’t like getting dirty 
when I go outside. 
Standard NEG PHO 
30. It’s usually too hot or 
too cold to enjoy being 
outdoors. 
Standard NEG PHO 
38. We should get rid of 
insects as much as we can. 
Standard NEG PHO 
43. I am really bothered by 
the sight of weeds in a 
lawn. 
Standard NEG PHO 
44. Insects that will bite or 
sting me are everywhere in 
nature. 
Standard NEG PHO 
8. I like useful animals, 
such as horses, police 
dogs, and seeing-eye dogs. 
Standard UTI PHO 
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BAI Item Coding Subscale23  Subscale24
16. The best plants and 
animals are those that 
people can eat or make 
into other things. 
Standard UTI PHO 
24. It’s okay to hunt animals 
for food. 
Standard UTI PHO 
32. Plants and animals are 
around for people to use. 
Standard UTI PHO 
39. Nature is good because it 
gives us many things we 
need.  
Standard UTI PHO 
*Item wording verbatim from Kellert (1976a) 
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Figure A.2 displays the instructions, items, and 
response options for Gagnon-Thompson and Barton’s (1994) 
Ecocentric/ Anthropocentric/Environmental Apathy Scale 
(EAEAS). 
 
Figure A.2 
Ecocentric/Anthropocentric/Environmental Apathy Scale   
DIRECTIONS: Please circle the number that indicates how 
much you agree or disagree with each of the following 
statements. 
 Strongly 
Disagree 
 
Neutral 
 
Strongly 
Agree 
1.  One of the worst things about 
over-population is that many 
natural areas are getting 
destroyed for development. 
1 2 3 4 5 
2. I can enjoy spending time in 
natural settings just for the 
sake of being out in nature. 
1 2 3 4 5 
3. Environmental threats such as 
deforestation and ozone 
depletion have been exaggerated. 
1 2 3 4 5 
4. The worst thing about the loss 
of the rain forest is that it 
will restrict the development of 
new medicines. 
1 2 3 4 5 
5.  Sometimes it makes me sad to see 
forests cleared for agriculture. 
1 2 3 4 5 
6. It seems to me that most 
conservationists are pessimistic 
and somewhat paranoid. 
1 2 3 4 5 
7. I prefer wildlife reserves to 
zoos. 
1 2 3 4 5 
8. The best thing about camping is 
that it is a cheap vacation. 
1 2 3 4 5 
9. I do not think the problem of 
depletion of natural resources is
as bad as many people make it out
to be. 
1 2 3 4 5 
10. I find it hard to get too con-
cerned about environmental issues
 
1 2 3 4 5 
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DIRECTIONS: Please circle the number that indicates how 
much you agree or disagree with each of the following 
statements. 
 Strongly 
Disagree 
 
Neutral 
 
Strongly 
Agree 
11. It bothers me that humans are 
running out of their supply of 
oil. 
1 2 3 4 5 
12. I need time in nature to be 
happy. 
1 2 3 4 5 
13. Science and technology will 
eventually solve our problems 
with pollution, overpopulation, 
and diminishing resources. 
1 2 3 4 5 
14. The thing that concerns me most 
about deforestation is that 
there will not be enough lumber 
for future generations. 
1 2 3 4 5 
15. I do not feel that humans are 
dependent on nature to survive. 
1 2 3 4 5 
16. Sometimes when I am unhappy I 
find comfort in nature. 
1 2 3 4 5 
17. Most environmental problems will 
solve themselves given enough 
time. 
1 2 3 4 5 
18. I don’t care about environmental 
problems. 
1 2 3 4 5 
19. One of the most important 
reasons to keep lakes and rivers 
clean is so that people have a 
place to enjoy water sports. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
20. I’m opposed to programs to 
preserve wilderness, reduce 
pollution, and conserve 
resources. 
1 2 3 4 5 
21. It makes me sad to see natural 
environments destroyed. 
1 2 3 4 5 
22. The most important reason for 
conservation is human survival. 
1 2 3 4 5 
23. One of the best things about 
recycling is that it saves 
money. 
1 2 3 4 5 
24. Nature is important because of 
what it can contribute to the 
pleasure and welfare of humans. 
1 2 3 4 5 
25. Too much emphasis has been 
placed on conservation. 
1 2 3 4 5 
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DIRECTIONS: Please circle the number that indicates how 
much you agree or disagree with each of the following 
statements. 
 Strongly 
Disagree 
 
Neutral 
 
Strongly 
Agree 
26. Nature is valuable for its own 
sake. 
1 2 3 4 5 
27. We need to preserve resources to 
maintain a high quality of life. 
1 2 3 4 5 
28. Being out in nature is a great 
stress reducer for me. 
1 2 3 4 5 
29. One of the most important 
reasons to conserve is to ensure 
a continued high standard of 
living. 
1 2 3 4 5 
30. One of the most important 
reasons to conserve is to 
preserve wild areas. 
1 2 3 4 5 
31. Continued land development is a 
good idea as long as a high 
quality of life can be 
preserved. 
1 2 3 4 5 
32. Sometimes animals seem almost 
human to me.     
1 2 3 4 5 
33. Humans are as much a part of the 
ecosystem as other animals. 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
Each EAEAS item’s coding (i.e., standard or reverse) and its 
associated subscale--Ecocentrism (ECO), Anthropocentrism 
(ANT), or Environmental Apathy (APA)--are shown in Table 
A.2. 
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Table A.2 
EAEAS item codings and subscales  
EAEAS Item Coding Subscale
1. One of the worst things about over-
population is that many natural areas 
are getting destroyed for development. 
Standard ECO
2. I can enjoy spending time in natural 
settings just for the sake of being out 
in nature. 
Standard ECO
5.  Sometimes it makes me sad to see forests 
cleared for agriculture. 
Standard ECO
7. I prefer wildlife reserves to zoos. Standard ECO
12. I need time in nature to be happy. Standard ECO
16. Sometimes when I am unhappy I find 
comfort in nature. 
Standard ECO
21. It makes me sad to see natural 
environments destroyed. 
Standard ECO
26. Nature is valuable for its own sake. Standard ECO
28. Being out in nature is a great stress 
reducer for me. 
Standard ECO
30. One of the most important reasons to 
conserve is to preserve wild areas. 
Standard ECO
32. Sometimes animals seem almost human to 
me. 
Standard ECO
33. Humans are as much a part of the 
ecosystem as other animals. 
Standard ECO
4. The worst thing about the loss of the 
rain forest is that it will restrict the 
development of new medicines. 
Standard ANT
8. The best thing about camping is that it 
is a cheap vacation. 
Standard ANT
11. It bothers me that humans are running out 
of their supply of oil. 
Standard ANT
13. Science and technology will eventually 
solve our problems with pollution, 
overpopulation, and diminishing 
resources. 
Standard ANT
14. The thing that concerns me most about 
deforestation is that there will not be 
enough lumber for future generations. 
Standard ANT
19. One of the most important reasons to 
keep lakes and rivers clean is so that 
people have a place to enjoy water 
sports. 
Standard ANT
22. The most important reason for 
conservation is human survival. 
Standard ANT
23. One of the best things about recycling 
is that it saves money. 
Standard ANT
24. Nature is important because of what it 
can contribute to the pleasure and 
welfare of humans. 
Standard ANT
27. We need to preserve resources to 
maintain a high quality of life. 
Standard ANT
29. One of the most important reasons to 
conserve is to ensure a continued high 
standard of living. 
Standard ANT
31. Continued land development is a good 
idea as long as a high quality of life 
can be preserved. 
Standard ANT
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EAEAS Item Coding Subscale
3. Environmental threats such as 
deforestation and ozone depletion have 
been exaggerated. 
Standard APA
6. It seems to me that most 
conservationists are pessimistic and 
somewhat paranoid. 
Standard APA
9. I do not think the problem of depletion 
of natural resources is as bad as many 
people make it out to be. 
Standard APA
10. I find it hard to get too concerned about 
environmental issues. 
Standard APA
15. I do not feel that humans are dependent 
on nature to survive. 
Standard APA
17. Most environmental problems will solve 
themselves given enough time. 
Standard APA
18. I don’t care about environmental 
problems. 
Standard APA
20. I’m opposed to programs to preserve 
wilderness, reduce pollution, and 
conserve resources. 
Standard APA
25. Too much emphasis has been placed on 
conservation. 
Standard APA
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Figure A.3 displays the instructions, items, and 
response options for Schultz’s (2000) Environmental Motives 
Scale (EMS). 
 
Figure A.3 
Environmental Motives Scale   
DIRECTIONS: People around the world are generally con-
cerned about environmental problems because of the conse-
quences that result from harming nature. However, people 
differ in the consequences that concern them the most.  
Please rate the following items for 1 (not important) to 7 
(supreme importance) in response to the question: I am 
concerned about environmental problems because of the 
consequences for ______________. 
 
Not 
important 
     
Supreme 
importance 
1. . . animals. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. . . plants. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. . . marine life. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4. . . birds. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5. . . me. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
6. . . my future. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
7. . . my lifestyle. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
8. . . my health. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
9. . . all people. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
10. . . children. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
11. . . people in my 
 community. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
12. . . my children. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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Each EMS item’s coding (i.e., standard or reverse) and its 
associated subscale--Egoistic (EGO), Altruistic (ALT), and 
Biospheric (BIO)--are shown in Table A.3. 
 
Table A.3 
EMS item codings and subscales  
EMS Item Coding Subscale
1. . . .  animals. Standard BIO
2. . . .  plants. Standard BIO
3. . . .  marine life. Standard BIO
4. . . .  birds. Standard BIO
5. . . .  me. Standard EGO
6. . . .  my future. Standard EGO
7. . . .  my lifestyle. Standard EGO
8. . . .  my health. Standard EGO
9. . . .  all people. Standard ALT
10. . . .  children. Standard ALT
11. . . .  people in my community. Standard ALT
12. . . .  my children. Standard ALT
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Figure A.4 displays the instructions, items, and 
response options for Dunlap, Van Liere, Mertig, and Jones’ 
(2000) Revised New Ecological Paradigm Scale (RNEPS). 
 
Figure A.4 
Revised New Ecological Paradigm Scale   
DIRECTIONS: Listed below are statements about the 
relationship between humans and the environment. For each 
statement, please indicate whether you STRONGLY AGREE 
(SA), MILDLY AGREE (MA), are UNSURE (U), MILDLY DISAGREE 
(MD), or STRONGLY DISAGREE (SD) with it. 
 Strongly 
agree 
 
Neutral 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
1.  We are approaching the limit of 
the number of people the earth 
can support. 
SA MA U MD SD
2. Humans have the right to modify 
the natural environment to suit 
their needs. 
SA MA U MD SD
3. When humans interfere with 
nature, it often produces 
disastrous consequences. 
SA MA U MD SD
4. Human ingenuity will insure that 
we do NOT make the earth 
unlivable. 
SA MA U MD SD
5.  Humans are severely abusing the 
environment. 
SA MA U MD SD
6. The earth has plenty of natural 
resources if we just learn how 
to develop them. 
SA MA U MD SD
7. Plants and animals have as much 
right as humans to exist. 
SA MA U MD SD
8. The balance of nature is strong 
enough to cope with the impacts 
of modern industrial nations. 
 
SA MA U MD SD
9. Despite our special abilities, 
humans are still subject to the 
laws of nature. 
SA MA U MD SD
10. The so-called "ecological crisis"
facing humankind has been greatly
exaggerated. 
 
SA MA U MD SD
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DIRECTIONS: Listed below are statements about the 
relationship between humans and the environment. For each 
statement, please indicate whether you STRONGLY AGREE 
(SA), MILDLY AGREE (MA), are UNSURE (U), MILDLY DISAGREE 
(MD), or STRONGLY DISAGREE (SD) with it. 
 Strongly 
agree 
 
Neutral 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
11. The earth is like a spaceship with 
very limited room and resources. 
SA MA U MD SD
12. Humans were meant to rule over 
the rest of nature. 
SA MA U MD SD
13. The balance of nature is very 
delicate and easily upset. 
SA MA U MD SD
14. Humans will eventually learn 
enough about how nature works to 
be able to control it. 
SA MA U MD SD
15. If things continue in their 
present course, we will soon 
experience a major ecological 
catastrophe. 
SA MA U MD SD
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Each RNEPS item’s coding (i.e., standard or reverse) is 
shown in Table A.4. 
 
Table A.4 
RNEPS item codings  
RNEPS Item Coding Subscale
1.  We are approaching the limit of the numbe
of people the earth can support. 
Standard N/A
2. Humans have the right to modify the 
natural environment to suit their needs. 
Reverse N/A
3. When humans interfere with nature, it 
often produces disastrous consequences. 
Standard N/A
4. Human ingenuity will insure that we do 
NOT make the earth unlivable. 
Reverse N/A
5.  Humans are severely abusing the 
environment. 
Standard N/A
6. The earth has plenty of natural 
resources if we just learn how to 
develop them. 
Reverse N/A
7. Plants and animals have as much right as 
humans to exist. 
Standard N/A
8. The balance of nature is strong enough 
to cope with the impacts of modern 
industrial nations. 
Reverse N/A
9. Despite our special abilities, humans are 
still subject to the laws of nature. 
Standard N/A
10. The so-called "ecological crisis" facing 
humankind has been greatly exaggerated. 
Reverse N/A
11. The earth is like a spaceship with very 
limited room and resources. 
Standard N/A
12. Humans were meant to rule over the rest 
of nature. 
Reverse N/A
13. The balance of nature is very delicate 
and easily upset. 
Standard N/A
14. Humans will eventually learn enough 
about how nature works to be able to 
control it. 
Reverse N/A
15. If things continue in their present 
course, we will soon experience a major 
ecological catastrophe. 
Standard N/A
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Figure A.5 displays the instructions, items, and 
response options for Mayer and McPherson-Frantz’s (2004) 
Connectedness to Nature Scale (CNS). 
 
Figure A.5 
Connectedness to Nature Scale   
DIRECTIONS: Please circle the number that indicates how 
much you agree or disagree with each of the following 
statements. 
 Strongly 
Disagree 
 
Neutral 
 
Strongly 
Agree
1.  I often feel a sense of oneness 
with the natural world around me. 
1 2 3 4 5 
2. I think of the natural world as a 
community to which I belong. 
1 2 3 4 5 
3. I recognize and appreciate the 
intelligence of other living 
organisms. 
1 2 3 4 5 
4. I often feel disconnected from 
nature. 
1 2 3 4 5 
5. When I think of my life, I imagine 
myself to be part of a larger 
cyclical process of living. 
1 2 3 4 5 
6. I often feel a kinship with 
animals and plants. 
1 2 3 4 5 
7. I feel as though I belong to the 
Earth as equally as it belongs to 
me. 
1 2 3 4 5 
8. I have a deep understanding of how 
my actions affect the natural 
world. 
1 2 3 4 5 
9. I often feel part of the web of 
life. 
1 2 3 4 5 
10. I feel that all inhabitants of 
Earth, human and nonhuman, share 
a common "life force." 
1 2 3 4 5 
11. Like a tree can be part of a 
forest, I feel embedded within 
the broader natural world. 
1 2 3 4 5 
12. When I think of my place on 
Earth, I consider myself to be a 
top member of a hierarchy that 
exists in nature. 
1 2 3 4 5 
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DIRECTIONS: Please circle the number that indicates how 
much you agree or disagree with each of the following 
statements. 
 Strongly 
Disagree 
 
Neutral 
 
Strongly 
Agree 
13. I often feel like I am only a 
small part of the natural world 
around me, and that I am no more 
important than the grass on the 
ground or the birds in the trees. 
1 2 3 4 5 
14. My personal welfare is 
independent of the welfare of the 
natural world. 
1 2 3 4 5 
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Each CNS item’s coding (i.e., standard or reverse) is shown 
in Table A.5. 
 
Table A.5 
CNS item codings  
CNS Item Coding Subscale
1.  I often feel a sense of oneness with the 
natural world around me. 
Standard N/A
2. I think of the natural world as a 
community to which I belong. 
Standard N/A
3. I recognize and appreciate the 
intelligence of other living organisms. 
Standard N/A
4. I often feel disconnected from nature. Reverse N/A
5. When I think of my life, I imagine 
myself to be part of a larger cyclical 
process of living. 
Standard N/A
6. I often feel a kinship with animals and 
plants. 
Standard N/A
7. I feel as though I belong to the Earth as 
equally as it belongs to me. 
Standard N/A
8. I have a deep understanding of how my 
actions affect the natural world. 
Standard N/A
9. I often feel part of the web of life. Standard N/A
10. I feel that all inhabitants of Earth, 
human and nonhuman, share a common "life 
force." 
Standard N/A
11. Like a tree can be part of a forest, I 
feel embedded within the broader natural 
world. 
Standard N/A
12. When I think of my place on Earth, I 
consider myself to be a top member of a 
hierarchy that exists in nature. 
Reverse N/A
13. I often feel like I am only a small part 
of the natural world around me, and that 
I am no more important than the grass on 
the ground or the birds in the trees. 
Standard N/A
14. My personal welfare is independent of 
the welfare of the natural world. 
Reverse N/A
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Figure A.6 displays the instructions, items, and 
response options for Nisbet, Zelenski, and Murphy’s (2008) 
Nature Relatedness Scale (NRS). 
 
Figure A.6 
Nature Relatedness Scale   
DIRECTIONS: Please circle the number that indicates how 
much you agree or disagree with each of the following 
statements. 
 Strongly 
Disagree 
 
Neutral 
 
Strongly 
Agree
1.  My connection to nature and the 
environment is part of my 
spirituality. 
1 2 3 4 5 
2. My relationship to nature is an 
important part of who I am. 
1 2 3 4 5 
3. I feel very connected to all 
living things and the earth. 
1 2 3 4 5 
4. I am not separate from nature, but 
a part of nature. 
1 2 3 4 5 
5. I always think about how my 
actions affect the environment. 
1 2 3 4 5 
6. I am very aware of environmental 
issues. 
1 2 3 4 5 
7. I think a lot about the suffering 
of animals. 
1 2 3 4 5 
8. Even in the middle of the city, I 
notice nature around me. 
1 2 3 4 5 
9. My feelings about nature do not 
affect how I live my life. 
1 2 3 4 5 
10. Humans have the right to use 
natural resources any way we want.
1 2 3 4 5 
11. Conservation is unnecessary 
because nature is strong. 
1 2 3 4 5 
12. Animals, birds, and plants have 
fewer rights than humans. 
1 2 3 4 5 
13. Some species are just meant to 
die out or become extinct. 
1 2 3 4 5 
14. Nothing I do will change problems 
in other places on the planet. 
1 2 3 4 5 
15. The state of nonhuman species is an 
indicator of the future for humans
 
1 2 3 4 5 
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DIRECTIONS: Please circle the number that indicates how 
much you agree or disagree with each of the following 
statements. 
 Strongly 
Disagree 
 
Neutral 
 
Strongly 
Agree 
16. The thought of being deep in the 
woods, away from civilization, is 
frightening. 
1 2 3 4 5 
17. My ideal vacation spot would be a 
remote, wilderness area. 
1 2 3 4 5 
18. I enjoy being outdoors, even in 
unpleasant weather. 
1 2 3 4 5 
19. I don’t often go out in nature. 1 2 3 4 5 
20. I enjoy digging in the earth and 
getting dirt on my hands. 
1 2 3 4 5 
21. I take notice of wildlife 
wherever I am. 
1 2 3 4 5 
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Each NRS item’s coding (i.e., standard or reverse) and its 
associated subscale--Self (SEL), Perspective (PER), or 
Experience (EXP)--are shown in Table A.6. 
 
Table A.6 
NRS item codings and subscales  
NRS Item Coding25 Subscale
1.  My connection to nature and the 
environment is part of my spirituality. 
Standard SEL
2. My relationship to nature is an 
important part of who I am. 
Standard SEL
3. I feel very connected to all living 
things and the earth. 
Standard SEL
4. I am not separate from nature, but a part 
of nature. 
Standard SEL
5. I always think about how my actions 
affect the environment. 
Standard SEL
6. I am very aware of environmental issues. Standard SEL
7. I think a lot about the suffering of 
animals. 
Standard SEL
8. Even in the middle of the city, I notice 
nature around me. 
Standard SEL
9. My feelings about nature do not affect how
I live my life. 
Reversed SEL
10. Humans have the right to use natural 
resources any way we want. 
Reversed PER
11. Conservation is unnecessary because 
nature is strong. 
Reversed PER
12. Animals, birds, and plants have fewer 
rights than humans. 
Reversed PER
13. Some species are just meant to die out 
or become extinct. 
Reversed PER
14. Nothing I do will change problems in 
other places on the planet. 
Reversed PER
15. The state of nonhuman species is an 
indicator of the future for humans. 
Standard PER
16. The thought of being deep in the woods, 
away from civilization, is frightening. 
Reversed EXP
17. My ideal vacation spot would be a 
remote, wilderness area. 
Standard EXP
18. I enjoy being outdoors, even in 
unpleasant weather. 
Standard EXP
19. I don’t often go out in nature. Reversed EXP
20. I enjoy digging in the earth and getting 
dirt on my hands. 
Standard EXP
21. I take notice of wildlife wherever I am. Standard EXP
                                                 
25
 Nisbet et al. (2008) does not specify the coding for any 
items except #11, which the articles note is “reversed.” 
However, the coding of the other NRS items can be reasonably 
inferred by examining the wording of each item and the 
construct for which the item is an indicator.  
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Figures A.7 and A.8 display the instructions, items, and 
response options for parts 1 and 2 of the Survey of 
Recreational Activities in Nature (SRAN). 
 
Figure A.7 
Survey of Recreational Activities in Nature (Part 1) 
DIRECTIONS: Please check the box that corresponds to the 
number of times in the past 12 months you participated in 
each of the following activities. 
 
0 times 
1 to 2 times 
3 to 4 times 
5 to 6 times 
7 to 8 times 
9 to 10 times 
11 or more times
1. Went camping. □ □ □ □ □ □ □
2. Went fishing. □ □ □ □ □ □ □
3. Went for a walk or hike in 
the desert or woods. 
□ □ □ □ □ □ □
4. Worked in a garden or cared 
for plants. 
□ □ □ □ □ □ □
5. Swam in a river, lake, sea, 
or ocean. 
□ □ □ □ □ □ □
6. Watched or listened to birds, 
insects, or other animals. 
□ □ □ □ □ □ □
7. Collected objects in nature 
such as rocks, leaves, fruit, 
nuts, pinecones, insects, or 
seashells. 
□ □ □ □ □ □ □
8. Gazed at stars or watched  
clouds. 
□ □ □ □ □ □ □
9. Rode in a canoe, kayak, 
sailboat, or other non-
motorized watercraft. 
□ □ □ □ □ □ □
10. Rode a horse. □ □ □ □ □ □ □
11. Went rock climbing. □ □ □ □ □ □ □
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Figure A.8 
Survey of Recreational Activities in Nature (Part 2) 
DIRECTIONS: Please check the box that corresponds to the 
number of times per year (on average) that you between 
ages 6 and 18 participated in each of the following 
activities. 
 
0 times 
1 to 2 times 
3 to 4 times 
5 to 6 times 
7 to 8 times 
9 to 10 times 
11 or more times 
1. Went camping. □ □ □ □ □ □ □
2. Went fishing. □ □ □ □ □ □ □
3. Went for a walk or hike in 
the desert or woods. 
□ □ □ □ □ □ □
4. Worked in a garden or cared 
for plants. 
□ □ □ □ □ □ □
5. Swam in a river, lake, sea, 
or ocean. 
□ □ □ □ □ □ □
6. Watched or listened to 
birds, insects, or other 
animals. 
□ □ □ □ □ □ □
7. Collected objects in nature 
such as rocks, leaves, 
fruit, nuts, pinecones, 
insects, or seashells. 
□ □ □ □ □ □ □
8. Gazed at stars or watched 
clouds. 
□ □ □ □ □ □ □
9. Rode in a canoe, kayak, 
sailboat, or other non-
motorized watercraft. 
□ □ □ □ □ □ □
10. Rode a horse. □ □ □ □ □ □ □
11. Went rock climbing. □ □ □ □ □ □ □
 
 134 
REFERENCES 
 
American Educational Research Association (AERA), American 
Psychological Association (APA), & National Council on 
Measurement in Education (NCME). (1999). Standards for 
Educational and Psychological Testing. Washington, D.C.: 
AERA. 
Barney, E., Mintzes, J., & Yen, C-F. (2005). Assessing 
knowledge, attitudes, and behavior toward charismatic 
megafauna: the case of dolphins. Journal of Environmental 
Education, 36(2), 41-55. 
Bernardi, R. (1994). Validating research results when 
Cronbach's alpha is below .70: a methodological 
procedure. Educational and Psychological Measurement, 
54(3), 766-776. 
Byrne, B. (2008). Structural Equation Modeling with EQS. New 
York: Routledge. 
Casey, P. & Scott, K. (2006). Environmental concern and 
behaviour in an Australian sample within an ecocentric-
anthropocentric framework. Australian Journal of 
Psychology, 58(2), 57-67. 
Cordiano, M., Welcomer, S., & Scherer, R. (2003). An 
analysis of the predictive validity of the New Ecological 
Paradigm Scale. Journal of Environmental Education, 
34(3), 22-28. 
 135 
DeVellis, R. (2003). Scale Development: Theory and 
Applications, Second Edition. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage 
Publications. 
Drews, C. (2002). Attitudes, knowledge, and wild animals as 
pets in Costa Rica. Anthrozoös, 15(2), 119-138. 
Drews, C. (2003). The state of wild animals in the minds and 
households of a neotropical society: the Costa Rican case 
study. In The State of the Animals II: 2003. Washington, 
D.C.: Humane Society Press.  
Dunlap, R. (2008). The new environmental paradigm scale: 
from marginality to worldwide use. Journal of 
Environmental Education, 40, 1. 3-18.   
Dunlap, R., Van Liere, K., Mertig, A., & Jones, R. (2000). 
Measuring endorsement of the new ecological paradigm: a 
revised NEP scale. Journal of Social Issues, 56, 425-442. 
Faber-Taylor, A., Wiley, A., Kuo, F., & Sullivan, W. (1998). 
Growing up in the inner city: green spaces as places to 
grow. Environment and Behavior, 30, 1. 3-27. 
Faber-Taylor, A., Kuo, F., & Sullivan, W. (2002). Views of 
nature and self-discipline: evidence from inner-city 
children. Journal of Environmental Psychology, 22, 49-63.  
Feral, C. (1998). The connectedness model and optimal 
development: is ecopsychology the answer to emotional 
well-being? The Humanistic Psychologist, 26(1-3), 243-
274. 
Frantz, C., Mayer, F., Norton, C. & Rock, M. (2005). There 
is no "I" in nature: the influence of self-awareness on 
 136 
connectedness to nature. Journal of Environmental 
Psychology, 25, 427-436.  
Furr, M. & Bacharach, V. (2008). Psychometrics: An 
Introduction. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications. 
Frumkin, H. (2001). Beyond toxicity: human health and the 
natural environment. American Journal of Preventive 
Medicine, 20(3), 234-240. 
Gagnon-Thompson, S., & Barton, M. (1994). Ecocentric and 
anthropocentric attitudes toward the environment. Journal 
of Environmental Psychology, 14, 149-157. 
Gardner, H. (1999). Intelligence Reframed: Multiple 
Intelligences for the 21st Century. New York: Basic Books.  
Gathright, J., Yamada, Y., & Morita, M. (2006). Comparison 
of the physiological and psychological benefits of tree 
and tower climbing. Urban Forestry & Urban Greening, 5, 
141-149. 
Gullone, E. (2000). The biophilia hypothesis and life in the 
21st century: increasing mental health or increasing 
pathology? Journal of Happiness Studies, 1, 293-321. 
Heerwagen, J. & Orians, G. (1993). Humans, habitats, and 
aethetics. In S. Kellert & E. Wilson (Eds.), The 
Biophilia Hypothesis (pp. 134-172). Washington, D.C.: 
Island Press. 
Herzog, H. (2002). Darwinism and the study of human-animal 
interactions. Society and Animals, 10(4), 361-367. 
 137 
Herzog, H. & Dorr, L. (2000). Electronically available 
surveys of attitudes toward animals. Society and Animals, 
8(2), 1-8. 
Hunter, L. & Rinner, L. (2003). The association between 
environmental perspective and knowledge and concern with 
species diversity. Society and Natural Resources, 17, 
517-532. 
Kahn, P. (1999). The Human Relationship with Nature: 
Development and Culture. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT 
Press.  
Katcher, A. & Wilkins, G. (1993). Dialogue with animals: its 
nature and culture. In S. Kellert & E. Wilson (Eds.), The 
Biophilia Hypothesis (pp. 173-197). Washington, D.C.: 
Island Press. 
Kellert, S. (1974). From Kinship to Mastery: A Study of 
American Attitudes Toward Animals. A report to the Fish 
and Wildlife Service of the United States Department of 
the Interior. 
Kellert, S. (1976a). A Study of American Attitudes Toward 
Animals, Part 2. A report to the Fish and Wildlife 
Service of the United States Department of the Interior. 
Kellert, S. (1976b). Perceptions of animals in American 
society. Transactions of the Forty-first North American 
Wildlife and Natural Resources Conference. Washington, 
D.C.: Wildlife Management Institute.  
Kellert, S. (1978). Attitudes and characteristics of 
hunters and antihunters. Transactions of the Forty-
 138 
third North American Wildlife and Natural Resources 
Conference. Washington, D.C.: Wildlife Management 
Institute.  
Kellert, S. (1979). Public Attitudes Toward Critical 
Wildlife and Natural Habitat Issues (Phase I). A report 
to the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service of the United 
States Department of the Interior. 
Kellert, S. (1980). Contemporary values of wildlife in 
American society. Wildlife Issues, 31-60.   
Kellert, S. (1985). Attitudes toward animals: age-related 
development among children. Journal of Environmental 
Education, 16(3), 29-39.  
Kellert, S. (1993a). The biological basis for human values 
of nature. In S. Kellert & E. Wilson (Eds.), The 
Biophilia Hypothesis (pp. 42-72). Washington, D.C.: 
Island Press.  
Kellert, S. (1993b). Attitudes, knowledge, and behavior 
toward wildlife among the industrial superpowers: United 
States, Japan, and Germany. Journal of Social Issues, 
49(1), 53-69.  
Kellert, S. (1993c). Values and perceptions of 
invertebrates. Conservation Biology, 7(4), 845-855.  
Kellert, S. (1996). The Value of Life: Biological Diver-
sity and Human Society. Washington, D.C.: Island Press.  
Kellert, S. (1997). Kinship to Mastery : Biophilia in 
Human Evolution and Development. Washington, D.C.: 
Island Press/Shearwater Books. 
 139 
Kellert, S. (1999). American Perceptions of Marine 
Mammals and their Management. Washington, D.C.: The 
Humane Society of the United States.  
Kellert, S. (2002). Experiencing nature: affective, 
cognitive, and evaluative development in children. In 
P. Kahn & S. Kellert (Eds.), Children and Nature: 
Psychological, Sociocultural, and Evolutionary 
Investigations. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.  
Kellert, S. (2005). Building for Life: Designing and 
Understanding the Human-Nature Connection. 
Washington, D.C.: Island Press.  
Kellert, S. & Berry, J. (1981). Knowledge, Affection, and 
Basic Attitudes Toward Animals in American Society 
(Phase III). A report to the U.S. Fish and Wildlife 
Service of the United States Department of the 
Interior.  
Kellert, S. & Westervelt, M. (1983). Children’s Attitudes, 
Knowledge and Behaviors Toward Animals (Phase V). A 
report to the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service of the 
United States Department of the Interior. 
Kline, R. (2005). Principles and Practice of Structural 
Equation Modeling, Second Edition. New York: Guilford 
Press. 
Knapp, T., & Brown, J. (1995). Ten measurement commandments 
that often should be broken. Research in Nursing and 
Health, 18, 465-469. 
Knight, A. (2008). "Bats, snakes and spiders, Oh my!" How 
 140 
aesthetic and negativistic attitudes, and other concepts 
predict support for species protection. Journal of 
Environmental Psychology, 28, 94-103. 
Knight, S., Nunkoosing, K., Vrij, A., & Cherryman, J. 
(2003). Using grounded theory to examine people’s 
attitudes toward how animals are used. Society and 
Animals, 11(4), 307-327. 
Kuo, F. & Faber-Taylor, A. (2004). A potential natural 
treatment for attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder: 
evidence from a national student. American Journal of 
Public Health, 94(9), 1580-1586.  
Lawrence, E. (1993). The sacred bee, the filthy pig, and the 
bat out of hell: animal symbolism as cognitive biophilia. 
In S. Kellert & E. Wilson (Eds.), The Biophilia 
Hypothesis (pp. 301-344). Washington, D.C.: Island Press. 
Lopez, B., Montes, C. & Benayas, J. (2007). The non-economic 
motives behind the willingness to pay for biodiversity 
conservation. Biological Conservation, 139, 67-82. 
Lukas, K. & Ross, S. (2005). Zoo visitor knowledge and 
Attitudes toward gorillas and chimpanzees. Journal of 
Environmental Education, 36(4), 33-48. 
Mayer, F. & McPherson-Frantz, C. (2004). The connectedness 
to nature scale: a measure of individuals’ feeling in 
community with nature. Journal of Environmental 
Psychology, 24, 503-515. 
Mayer, F., McPherson-Frantz, C., Bruehlman-Senecal, E., & 
Dolliver, K. (2008). Why is nature beneficial? The role 
 141 
of connectedness to nature. Environment and Behavior 
OnlineFirst, doi:10.1177/0013916508319745. 
Morita, E., Fukuda, S., Nagano, J., Hamajima, N., Yamamotod, 
H., Iwai, Y., Nakashima, T., Ohira, H., & Shirakawaa, T. 
(2007). Psychological effects of forest environments on 
healthy adults: Shinrin-yoku (forest-air bathing, 
walking) as a possible method of stress reduction. Public 
Health, 121, 54-63. 
Myers. O. & Saunders, C. (2002). Animals as links toward 
developing relationships. In P. Kahn & S. Kellert (Eds.), 
Children and Nature: Psychological, Sociocultural, and 
Evolutionary Investigations. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Nabhan, G. & St. Antoine, S. (1993). The loss of floral and 
faunal story: the extinction of experience. In S. Kellert 
& E. Wilson (Eds.), The Biophilia Hypothesis (pp. 229-
250). Washington, D.C.: Island Press. 
Nabhan, G. (1994). Children in touch, creatures in story. In 
G. Nabhan & S. Trimble (Eds.), The Geography of 
Childhood: Why Children Need Wild Places. Boston: Beacon 
Press. 
Nash, J. (1991). Loving Nature: Ecological Integrity and 
Christian Responsibility. Nashville, TN: Abingdon Press. 
Nisbet, E. & Zelenski, J. (2004). Nature relatedness and 
subjective well-being: are nature lovers happier people? 
Paper presented at the 65th Annual Convention of the 
Canadian Psychological Association, St. John’s, 
Newfoundland. 
 142 
Nisbet, E., Zelenski, J., & Murphy, S. (2008). The nature 
relatedness scale: linking individuals’ connection with 
nature to environmental concern and behavior. Environment 
and Behavior OnlineFirst, doi:1.1177/0013916508318748 
Orr, D. (1993). Love it or lose it: the coming biophilia 
revolution. In S. Kellert & E. Wilson (Eds.), The 
Biophilia Hypothesis (pp. 415-440). Washington, D.C.: 
Island Press. 
Pierre-Louis, K. (2010). Overcoming biophobia is sustainable 
development. Sustainable Development. 
http://www.justmeans.com/Overcoming-Biophobia-in-
Sustainable-Development/16504.html 
Plous, S. (1993). Psychological mechanisms in the human use 
of animals. Journal of Social Issues, 49(1), 11-52. 
Prokop, P. & Kubiatko, M. (2008). Bad wolf kills lovable 
rabbits: children’s attitudes toward predator and prey. 
Electronic Journal of Science Education, 12(1), 1-16. 
Rauwald, K. & Moore, C. (2002). Environmental attitudes as 
predictors of policy support across three countries. 
Environment and Behavior, 34(6), 709-739. 
Rideout, B., Hushen, K., McGinty, D., Perkins, S., & Tate, 
J. (2005). Endorsement of the new ecological paradigm in 
systematic and e-mail samples of college students. 
Journal of Environmental Education, 36(2), 15-23. 
Sagan, D. & Margulis, L. (1993). God, Gaia, and biophilia. 
In S. Kellert & E. Wilson (Eds.), The Biophilia 
Hypothesis (pp. 345-364). Washington, D.C.: Island Press. 
 143 
 
Schultz, P. (2000). Empathizing with nature: the effects of 
perspective taking on concern for environmental issues. 
Journal of Social Issues, 56, 391-406. 
Schultz, P. (2001). The structure of environmental concern: 
concern for self, other people, and the biosphere. 
Journal of Environmental Psychology, 21, 327-339. 
Schultz, P., Gouveia, V., Cameron, L., Tankha, G., Schmuck, 
P., & Franěk, M. (2005). Values and their relationship to 
environmental concern and conservation behavior. Journal 
of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 36(4), 457-475.  
Schultz, P., Schriver, C., Tabanico, J., & Khazian, A. 
(2004). Implicit connections with nature. Journal of 
Environmental Psychology, 24, 31-42. 
Schultz, P. & Zelezny, L. (1999). Values as predictors of 
environmental attitudes: evidence for consistency across 
14 countries. Journal of Environmental Psychology, 19, 
255-265. 
Thompson, T. & Mintzes, J. (2002). Cognitive structure and 
the affective domain: on knowing and feeling in biology. 
International Journal of Science Education, 24(6), 645-
660. 
Townsend, M. (2006). Feel blue? Touch green! Participation 
in forest/woodland management as a treatment for 
depression. Urban Forestry & Urban Greening, 5, 111-120. 
Ulrich, R. (1993). Biophilia, biophobia, and natural land-
scapes. In S. Kellert & E. Wilson (Eds.), The Biophilia 
 144 
Hypothesis (pp. 73-137). Washington, D.C.: Island Press. 
Ulrich, R., Simons, S., Losito, B., Fiorito, M., Miles, M. & 
Zelson, M. (1991). Stress recovery during exposure to 
natural and urban environments. Journal of Environmental 
Psychology, 11, 201-230.  
Velarde, M., Fry, G., & Tveit, M. (2007). Health effects of 
viewing landscapes – Landscape types in environmental 
psychology. Urban Forestry & Urban Greening, 6, 199-212. 
Vollum, S., Buffington-Vollum, J., & Longmire, D. (2004). 
Moral disengagement and attitudes about violence toward 
animals. Society and Animals, 12(3), 209-235. 
Wells, N. & Evans, G. (2003). Nearby nature: a buffer of 
life stress among rural children. Environment and 
Behavior, 35(3), 311-330. 
Willis, H. & DeKay, M. (2007). The roles of group 
membership, beliefs, and norms in ecological risk 
perception. Risk Analysis, 27(5), 1365-1380. 
Wilson, E. (1984). Biophilia. Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press. 
Wilson, E. (1993). Biophilia and the conservation ethic. In 
S. Kellert & E. Wilson (Eds.), The Biophilia Hypothesis 
(pp. 31-41). Washington, D.C.: Island Press. 
Zografos, C. & Alcroft, D. (2007). The environmental values 
of potential ecotourists: a segmentation study. Journal 
of Sustainable Tourism, 15(1), 44-66. 
 
  
 145 
ell_ee_ell@hotmail.com 
larry.letourneau@unlv.edu 
 
 
 
EDUCATION: 
 
Ph.D. Educational Psychology, 2013 University of Nevada, Las Vegas 
 Concentration: Assessment and Evaluation G.P.A.: 3.9 
Dissertation: In progress 
Completed coursework includes: 
 Human Measurement  Categorical/Non-Parametric Statistics 
 Item Response Theory  Large Scale Secondary Data Analysis 
 Advanced Research Methods  Evaluation Research Methods 
 Inferential Statistics and Experimental Design  Advanced Evaluation Research Methods 
 Multivariate Statistics  Survey Methods 
 Latent Variable Models  
 
M.Ed. Curriculum and Instruction, 2000 University of Nevada, Las Vegas 
Concentration: Secondary Education G.P.A.: 3.8 
 
M.A.  English, 1993 University of Nevada, Las Vegas 
  G.P.A.: 3.7 
 
B.A.  English, 1991 University of Tampa 
  G.P.A.: 3.9 
 
 
 
 
WORK EXPERIENCE: 
 
Director for Research and Compliance  2002 - Present 
Center for Academic Enrichment and Outreach (CAEO)  University of Nevada, Las Vegas 
Las Vegas, Nevada 
 Wrote 40 grant proposals that altogether secured more than $110,000,000, including multi-
year funding for all 18 of the projects currently housed within CAEO. Each grant proposal 
required the:  
 Collection, synthesis, and analysis of aggregated and disaggregated data to substantiate 
need for the project and to set baseline percentage targets for project objectives;  
 Articulation of a well-designed plan of operation; 
 Development of detailed descriptions of key project personnel;  
 Acquisition of written commitments from relevant project partners; 
 Careful construction of a budget that supports the accomplishment of project objectives 
and adheres to sponsoring agency specifications; 
 Explication of an evaluation plan that includes both formative and summative indicators 
related to project objectives; and 
 Strict adherence to proposal page limits, formatting requirements, and online (grants.gov 
and the U.S. Department of Education’s e-application) submission procedures. 
 Designed procedures for the systematic collection of data to be utilized in the evaluation of 
CAEO’s federally funded TRiO and GEARUP projects and in the monitoring of projects’ 
 146 
compliance with statutory and regulatory requirements. Supervised the implementation of 
these procedures. 
 Developed CAEO TRiO participant application forms, CAEO policies for the processing of 
completed TRiO participant applications, and CAEO policies for the structuring of TRiO 
participant files. 
 Managed federally funded projects that provide professional-development seminars for 
current and prospective employees of the nation's 2,400 TRiO grantees, with specific 
responsibility for: 
 Designing and implementing all project processes and procedures;  
 Establishing timelines for the completion of all key project tasks;  
 Developing all project marketing materials;  
 Recruiting and selecting seminar attendees; 
 Continuously adjusting seminar enrollments to compensate for attrition;  
 Defining the content domains for seminars; 
 Establishing seminar agendas; 
 Supervising seminar faculty;  
 Negotiating contracts for meeting space, lodging, and food/beverage services; 
 Acquiring equipment and supplies for seminars; and 
 Evaluating project activities, which included the collection and analysis of data needed 
for federal reporting purposes.  
 Served as one of 18 members of the U.S. Department of Education’s negotiated rulemaking 
committee for discretionary grants, charged with writing new federal regulations for TRiO, 
GEAR UP, and other Title IV programs in response to the passage of the Higher Education 
Opportunity Act (HEOA) of 2008. 
 Served on Division of Student Affairs’ Assessment Committee (2002 - 2004 & 2006 - 2009). 
 
 
Workshops Faculty Member    2009 - 2010 
Council for Opportunity in Education (COE)    
Washington, D.C. 
 Served on faculty of COE’s proposal-writing workshops for FY2010 TRiO Student Support 
Services grant competition, FY2011 TRiO Talent Search grant competition, and FY2011 
TRiO Educational Opportunity Centers grant competition. 
 
 
Academic Coordinator     2000 - 2002 
Center for Academic Enrichment and Outreach (CAEO)  University of Nevada, Las Vegas 
Las Vegas, Nevada 
 Recruited, hired, and supervised instructors for CAEO’s TRiO projects. 
 Provided study-skills workshops (e.g., note taking, test taking, goal time management) and 
direct services (e.g., college-admissions counseling, financial-aid counseling) to middle-
school and high-school students who participated in CAEO’s TRiO Talent Search and TRiO 
Upward Bound projects. 
 Taught writing-skills workshops for CAEO’s TRiO Student Support Services project. 
 Planned and supervised field trips to institutions of higher learning, worksites, cultural events, 
and recreational activities. 
 
 
Academic Advisor/Counselor    1996 - 2000 
Center for Academic Enrichment and Outreach (CAEO)  University of Nevada, Las Vegas 
Las Vegas, Nevada 
 Provided study-skills workshops and direct services to middle-school and high-school 
students who participated in CAEO’s TRiO Talent Search and TRiO Upward Bound projects. 
 147 
 Planned and supervised field trips to institutions of higher learning, worksites, cultural events, 
and recreational activities. 
 Served as residential assistant for CAEO’s TRiO Upward Bound projects. 
 
 
Editorial Director     1994 - 1995 
Jamsa Press 
Las Vegas, Nevada 
 Edited and proofread instructional books on computer programming (Visual Basic, C++, 
TCP/IP), PC-based productivity software (MS Word, MS PowerPoint, MS Access, MS Excel), 
and operating systems. 
 Supervised developmental editors, copy editors, technical editors, and proofreaders. 
 Developed guidelines, style manuals, and check lists for use by all editorial staff members. 
 
 
Graduate Assistant     1991 - 1993 
Department of English      University of Nevada, Las Vegas 
Las Vegas, Nevada 
 Taught freshman composition. 
 Served as research assistant to Department’s medieval-literature scholar. 
 Tutored undergraduates in Department’s writing center. 
 
 
GRANT PROPOSAL WRITING: 
 
 Wrote grant proposals that generated funding for: 
 One (1) Training Program for Federal TRiO Programs Personnel project  
operating from 2002 to 2004, with an annual budget of $170,000; 
 Two (2) Training Program for Federal TRiO Programs Personnel projects  
operating from 2006 to 2008, with annual budgets of $400,000 and $400,000, 
respectively; 
 Two (2) Training Program for Federal TRiO Programs Personnel projects  
operating from 2008 to 2010, with annual budgets of $400,000 and $450,000, 
respectively; 
 Three (3) Training Program for Federal TRiO Programs Personnel projects  
operating from 2010 to 2012, with annual budgets of $348,000, $348,000, and $388,000, 
respectively; 
 Two (2) Training Program for Federal TRiO Programs Personnel projects  
operating from 2012 to 2014, with annual budgets of $125,000 and $250,000, 
respectively; 
 One (1) TRiO Student Support Services project operating from 2005 to 2010,  
with an annual budget of $315,000; 
 Three (3) TRiO Student Support Services projects operating from 2010 to 2015,  
with annual budgets of $342,239, $220,000, and $200,000, respectively; 
 Two (2) Gaining Early Awareness and Readiness for Undergraduate Programs (GEAR UP) 
partnerships  
operating from 2005 to 2011, with annual budgets of $2,074,000 and $2,429,000, respectively; 
 Three (3) Gaining Early Awareness and Readiness for Undergraduate Programs (GEAR UP) 
partnerships operating from 2011 to 2018, with annual budgets of $2,881,608, $2,464,426, and 
$1,660,733, respectively; 
 Three (3) TRiO Talent Search projects operating from 2006 to 2011,  
with annual budgets of $319,000, $257,000, and $219,000, respectively; 
 Four (4) TRiO Talent Search projects operating for 2011 to 2016,  
with annual budgets of $319,000, $249,000, $230,000, and $229,000, respectively; 
 148 
 Two (2) TRiO Educational Opportunity Center projects operating from 2006 to 2011,  
with annual budgets of $219,000 and $219,000, respectively; 
 One (1) TRiO Educational Opportunity Center project operating from 2011 to 2016,  
with an annual budget of $230,000; 
 Three (3) TRiO Upward Bound projects operating from 2007 to 2012,  
with annual budgets of $409,000, $249,000, and $249,000, respectively; 
 Three (3) TRiO Upward Bound projects operating from 2012 to 2017,  
with annual budgets of $409,000, $250,000, and $250,000, respectively; 
 One (1) TRiO Upward Bound Math and Science project operating from 2007 to 2012,  
with an annual budget of $249,000; 
 Two (2) TRiO Upward Bound Math and Science projects operating from 2012 to 2017,  
with annual budgets of $250,000 and $250,000, respectively; 
 One (1) TRiO McNair Postbaccalaureate Achievement Program project  
operating from 2007 to 2012, with an annual budget of $231,000; and 
 One (1) TRiO McNair Postbaccalaureate Achievement Program project  
operating from 2012 to 2017, with an annual budget of $231,000. 
 Wrote high-scoring but unfunded proposals for each of the following grant competitions: 
 GEAR UP (2007)—2 partnership proposals,  
each scoring 96 out of 100 possible points; 
 GEAR UP (2011)—1 partnership proposal,  
scoring 101 out of 106 possible points; 
 Training Program for Federal TRiO Programs Personnel (2002)—4 proposals,  
each scoring 100 out of 100 possible points; 
 Training Program for Federal TRiO Programs Personnel (2006)—2 proposals  
scoring 98 and 100, respectively, out of 100 possible points; 
 Training Program for Federal TRiO Programs Personnel (2010)—1 proposal  
scoring 100 out of 100 possible points; 
 TRiO Talent Search (2010) —2 proposals  
scoring 97 and 99, respectively, out of 100 possible points;  
 TRiO Educational Opportunity Center (2005)—1 proposal  
scoring 99 out of 100 possible points;  
 TRiO Educational Opportunity Center (2011)—2 proposals,  
scoring 99 and 101, respectively, out of 102 possible points; 
 TRiO Upward Bound Math and Science (2006)—2 proposals,  
each scoring 96 out of 100 possible points; and 
 TRiO Veterans Upward Bound (2012)—1 proposal 
each scoring 105 out of 110 possible points. 
 
 
RESEARCH SKILLS: 
 
Extensive knowledge of Microsoft (MS) Word, MS PowerPoint, MS Access, MS Excel, and SPSS 
Experience with Visual Basic for Applications, EQS (Structural-equation-modeling statistical 
software), BILOG (Item-response-theory statistical software), and HLM (Multi-level-regression 
statistical software) 
 
 
PRESENTATIONS: 
 
Letourneau, L. (2009). HEOA leadership panel: advocacy in the crafting of policy. 2009 Annual 
Conference of the National Educational Opportunity Centers Association, San Antonio, 
Texas. 
 149 
 
Letourneau, L. (2008). Development and validation of an instrument to measure nature deficit 
disorder attitudes. Presentation at the 26th Annual Conference of the Northern Rocky 
Mountain Educational Research Association, Lake Tahoe, Nevada. 
 
Zvoch, K. & Letourneau, L. (2007). Evaluating program implementation: concepts, methods, and 
applications. Full-day, professional-development workshop conducted at the 2007 
Annual Conference of the American Evaluation Association, Baltimore, Maryland. 
 
Letourneau, L., & Zvoch, K. (2006). When infidelity (of program implementation) is good: an 
implementation-by-outcome study of counterintuitive findings. Presentation at the 2006 
Annual Conference of the American Evaluation Association, Portland, Oregon. 
 
Letourneau, L., Zvoch, K. & Nix, L. (2005). An outcomes-by-implementation evaluation of a 
literacy program for struggling 9th grade readers. Presentation at the 2005 Joint Canadian 
Evaluation Society / American Evaluation Association Conference, Toronto, Ontario, 
Canada. 
 
Letourneau, L. (2003). Factors that influence middle school students to enroll in algebra. Poster 
session at 2003 Annual Meeting of the American Educational Research Association, 
Chicago, IL. 
 
 
PUBLICATIONS: 
 
Zvoch, K. & Letourneau, L. (2007). A multilevel multisite outcomes-by-implementation 
evaluation of an early childhood literacy model. American Journal of Evaluation, 28(2), 
132-150. 
 
